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STANDARDS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF PROFESSIONALS IN
BANKRUPTCY CASES: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR ZYWICKI'S
"CASE FOR RETAINING THE DISINTERESTEDNESS REQUIREMENT

FOR DEBTOR IN POSSESSION'S PROFESSIONALS"
GeraldK. Smith1
I. INTRODUCTION

My task is to respond to Professor Todd J. Zywicki's article, "Mend It, Don't
End It: The Case for Retaining the Disinterestedness Requirement for Debtor in
Possession's Professionals." 2 I will start on a positive note by agreeing with
Professor Zywicki's statements that "[t]here is a strong public interest in the fair
and efficient administration of the bankruptcy system,"' and that "[i]t is doubtful that the debate over disinterestedness is over." 4 And I will continue the
debate by proposing an alternative which should lead to a more fair and efficient
administration. Although I will discuss several points of disagreement, especially historical ones, I will limit my comments to important issues.
Professor Zywicki's article on disinterestedness is essentially a memorandum
coauthored by Judge Edith H. Jones and Professor Zywicki (Jones/Zywicki
Memorandum), which was designed to persuade the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission ("Review Commission") (1) to reverse its recommendation
that the Bankruptcy Code's employment standards be revised by abandoning the
per se disqualification provisions of the disinterestedness standard for professionals employed by the debtor in possession and (2) not to adopt a definition of
1. Partner, Lewis and Roca LLP. B.S., Kansas State University (1958); LL.B., New York University
(1961); Deputy Director, Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States (which produced the first
draft of the current Bankruptcy Code); Member, National Bankruptcy Conference and Chair of its Ethics
Committee; Member, Advisory Committee on Rules of Bankruptcy of the Judicial Conference of the United
States and Chair of its Subcommittee on Rule 2014 Disclosure Requirements; Member, Ethics Working Group
of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission; and Former Chair of the Ethics Subcommittee of the
Business Bankruptcy Committee of the Business Section of the American Bar Association. In addition to the
foregoing "connections" in keeping with Justice William 0. Douglasi admonition, I make the following disclosures. I am involved in a general practice, which includes commercial litigation and bankruptcy matters. From
time to time, I represent trustees, debtors in possession, creditors' committees, secured creditors, unsecured
creditors, and other parties in interest in bankruptcy cases. For more than ten years, I have been involved in
efforts to improve employment standards, disclosure standards and employment procedures in bankruptcy
cases. I have written and lectured on these matters, and as a result, I am undoubtedly biased in favor of the
views I have come to hold over the years. I have also been involved in a few disqualification disputes, one of
the more interesting of which is discussed in Gerald K. Smith, Conflicts of Interest in Workouts and Bankruptcy
Reorganization Cases, 48 S.C. L. REv. 793, 863-65, 878-80 (1997). Although I have no client relationship in
connection with this Article, I bring these matters which may have influenced my views to the attention of the
reader. The views stated herein are not necessarily those of Lewis and Roca or any of the committees or organizations I am, or have been. associated with.
2. 18 Miss. C. L. REv. 291 (1998).
3. Id.at 301.
4. Id.at 327.
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adverse interest similar to the definition of conflict of interest contained in the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers ("Restatement"). '
The result of the Jones/Zywicki Memorandum and the opposition of Judge
Jones was an about-face by the Review Commission, which changed its position
by recommending that the disinterestedness standard be retained, but modified to
provide that an immaterial ownership or creditor interest should not disqualify a
professional from representing the debtor in possession. The modification is
meaningless. Courts consistently allow professionals to avoid disqualification by
a waiver or sale, and the professional would surely do so if the ownership or
creditor interest is immaterial. As I believe the following discussion will establish, Professor Zywicki's article, which is essentially a rewrite of the Memorandum, is flawed, but nonetheless achieved its purpose and persuaded the Review
Commission to make no meaningful recommendation to improve the standards
and procedures for the employment of professionals in bankruptcy cases. But
that is history. What is significant is that Judge Jones and Professor Zywicki
have articulated a new standard for counsel for the debtor in possession which
has the potential of significantly impacting the nature of reorganizations as well
as who can represent trustees and management in reorganization cases. 8
Professor Zywicki's opening salvo attempts to prejudice the reader by asserting
that "the 'disinterestedness' requirement for counsel for debtors in possession has
been the subject of several high-profile and controversial bankruptcy cases."' The
four cases he discusses have little to do with the debate concerning the standard
5. The definition in Section 201 of conflict of interest captures the essence of an adverse interest, as that
term is used in the Bankruptcy Code. It provides that a conflict, or adverse interest, exists if there is a substantial risk that an interest, representation, or duty would materially and adversely affect the proposed representation. Its use in the Bankruptcy Code would bring much needed clarity and focus on the correct issue, the adequacy of the proposed representation. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 201
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
6. A much broader revolution may be taking place.
At the center of this change lies the myth of elitism. The profession has staked its claim to self-regulation on the narrative of the legal profession as elite, an aristocracy that could be counted on to act
with virtue, integrity, and as servants of the public interest. If this narrative continues to erode in the
minds of the lawmakers, we can expect a greater degree of external regulation. This might lead to
the bar's nightmare in which the Atticus Finches of the world have been replaced by government
moles. Or it might lead to a world in which lawyers take more seriously their obligation to conform
their own conduct to the state's law and also more closely realize the profession's long-standing
ideals.
Thomas Ross, Knowing No Other Duty, Privity, the Myth of Elitism, and the Transformation of the Legal
Profession, 32 WArE FOREST L. REv. 819, 822-23 (1997).
The lawyer as champion is an often-told tale, and not just at bar association meetings. For example,
from Gregory Peck's character in the movie "To Kill a Mockingbird" to Christian Slater's role as the
attorney taking on the American penal system in "Murder in the First," the lawyer is often depicted
as protecting the solitary, marginalized individual from the awesomely spooky state. Running parallel to the narrative of the lawyer as champion is the nightmare of the lawyer as serving other masters. The nightmare version of the lawyer's epic is the lawyer for the criminal defendant who is actually working for the crime boss, the lawyer who for whatever reason sells out his client because he is
beholden to some other set of interests. What could be more chilling than to discover that your
lawyer serves not you but the other side? Imagine an Atticus Finch who manipulated his client's
conviction in order to remain in the good graces of the politically powerful of his community.
Id. at 859.
7. Zywicki, supra note 2, at 291.
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for employment of professionals. In re The Leslie Fay Cos. and Bucyrus-Erie
involved disclosure. 8 The relationships which were not disclosed, if known,
might have disqualified counsel entirely in Bucyrus-Erie and probably would
have led to the appointment of special counsel in Leslie Fay. In re Cajun
Electric Cooperative,Inc. involved disqualification of counsel for a group of
owners. 9 Counsel who had represented one of the owners of the debtor, with the
consent of that client, took on the representation of a group of owners, which
included the client. This was on the basis that counsel would resign if interests
of owners differed. Differences arose and the initial client resigned from the
8. One of the cases relied on by Professor Zywicki is In re The Leslie Fay Cos., 175 B.R. 525 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1994). In Leslie Fay, Judge Brozman held that counsel for the debtor in possession, who was apparently to continue a pre-petition investigation, had several conflicts of interest since it represented clients whose
conduct was to be investigated as well as clients whose executives were to be investigated, including an individual partner of a partnership whose conduct was to be investigated. Judge Brozman concluded that counsel "had
a perceptible economic incentive not to pursue the possibility of claims against [clients] . . . with the same
vigor and intensity it might have otherwise applied." Id. at 534. As to clients, Judge Brozman correctly
observed that counsel "should be presumed to be loyal to its clients." Id. at 535. However, Judge Brozman's
conclusion that Bankruptcy Rule 2014 required the disclosure of Weil Gotshal & Manges' connection with
Bear Steams and Odyssey is not clearly correct. Bankruptcy Rule 2014 states that
[tihe application shall state.... to the best of the applicant's knowledge, all of the person's connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee, or any person employed in the office of the United States trustee.
The application shall be accompanied by a verified statement of the person to be employed setting
forth the person's connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective
attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee, or any person employed in the office of the
United States Trustee.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014.
Bear Steams and Odyssey were potential defendants, but not "the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest
[or] their respective attorneys and accountants'" Judge Brozman seemed to agree with Weil Gotshal's position
to that effect, but nevertheless held that disclosure of the relationships with Bear Steams and Odyssey was
required.
Weil Gotshal urges that it is not necessary to disclose connections to companies with which the
members of the debtor's board of directors are affiliated. As a general statement, that may have
some validity. But where counsel is being retained to conduct an investigation into the actions of,
among others, senior management and the members of the board of directors, most assuredly connections with entities affiliated with board members that could cause pressure on investigating
counsel must be disclosed. It is by the same rationale that the connection with Seidman had to be
disclosed.
In re The Leslie Fay Cos., 175 B.R. at 536.
I concur that such relationships should be disclosed. Leslie Fay not only reveals the inadequacy of Rule 2014,
but it also highlights the inadequacy of the Bankruptcy Code disinterestedness/adverse interests standards.
Excluding Forstmann and Seidman from the analysis, Weil Gotshal arguably did not have an interest within the
meaning of § 101(14)(E) or hold or represent an adverse interest within the meaning of § 327(a). Section
101(14)(E) disqualifies one who has an "interest materially adverse ... by reason of any ... relationship to,
connection with, or interest in the debtor...... Section 201 of the Restatement more broadly identifies the
relationship by use of the phrase "lawyer's own interests."
Unless all affected clients and other necessary persons consent to the representation under the limitations and conditions provided in § 202, a lawyer may not represent a client if the representation
would involve a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest is involved if there is a substantial risk that
the lawyer's representation of the client would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's
own interests or by the lawyer's duties to another current client, a former client, or a third person.
RESTATEMENr, supra note 5, at § 201.
9. In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 191 B.R. 659, 27 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1217 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1979)
(Motion to Disqualify Dann, Pecar, Newman & Kleiman as Counsel for the Unofficial Members' Committee
and for Expedited Hearing on Same; Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disqualify Dann, Pecar, Newman
& Kleiman as Counsel for the Unofficial Members' Committee and for Expedited Hearing on the Same;
Response to Motion to Disqualify Dann Pecar Newman & Kleiman as Counsel for the Unofficial Members'
Committee and for Expedited Hearing on Same; and Supplemental Memorandum on Behalf of Slemco in
Support of Motion to Disqualify Dann, Pecar, Newman & Kleiman as Counsel for the Unofficial Members'
Committee).
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group. The attorney continued to represent the group, and the initial client
requested that the court disqualify counsel from doing so. The court did so on
the basis of the applicable state conflict rules.
In In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., counsel for the debtor in possession

represented three parties in interest in unrelated matters--the majority shareholder of one of the debtors, a principal unsecured creditor of another debtor, and the
postpetition lender to all of the debtors under a $1 billion financing facility."'
Complete and absolute waivers of any conflict were furnished by such parties in
interest,"1 and counsel stated that it would initiate suit against such clients if necessary. 2 Apparently, Professor Zywicki believes that the court's approval of such
counsel was improper under the disinterestedness standard; nonetheless, he
referred to Montgomery Ward as one of the notorious cases of recent vintage
which justifies the disinterestedness standard! 3 However, Montgomery Ward
involves the adverse interest standard of § 327(a), not the disinterestedness standard.' The court authorized employment since the revenues from the unrelated
representations were a small percentage of counsel's yearly revenues and the
clients had executed unconditional waivers.1 " In the parlance of the Restatement,
10. In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., U.S.B.C., Chapter 11 Case No. 97-1409 (Bankr. D. Del. 1997).
11. "Party in interest" is partially defined in § 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to include "the debtor, the
trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or
any indenture trustee." It has that meaning when used in this article. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1993 & Supp.
1997).
12. In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., U.S.B.C., Chapter II Case No. 97-1409 (Bankr. D. Del. 1997).
13. Zywicki, supra note 2, at n.3.
14. Id.
15. 6. At the request of the Office of the United States Trustee, I am making the disclosures set forth
in paragraph 6 of this Affidavit. The revenues realized by Jones Day in connection with services
rendered to GE Capital, expressed as a percentage of total Jones Day firm revenue, are as follows:
* 1996
.05%
* 12 months ending May 1997
.05%
* 6 months ending May 1997
.06%
The revenues realized by Jones Day in connection with services rendered to GE, expressed as a percentage of total Jones Day firm revenue, are as follows:
* 1996
.58%
.70%
12 months ending May 1997
.75%
* 6 months ending May 1997
With respect to the relative size of GE and GE Capital as Jones Day clients, their client rankings for
the same measuring periods are as follows:
GE Capita
GE
370
27
1996
12 months ending May 1997
323
21
313
21
S6 months ending May 1997
7. GE Capital has provided Jones Day with a general waiver of conflicts, which is unconditional
and without limitation. A copy of such waiver is attached hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated
herein by reference. Jones Day would initiate suit against GE Capital should such action be called
for under the facts of these chapter II cases.
Supplemental Affidavit of David S. Kurtz dated September 2, 1997, filed in In re Montgomery Ward. This filing probably was prompted by the observations of Professors Klee and Warren. See Conflict of Interest
Questions Raised in Montgomery Ward Filing, 30 BANKRUPTCY CT. DECISIONS, (July 22, 1977), Issue 25, at A 1.
The waiver eliminated possible disqualification under applicable state rules of professional conduct and the
potential limiting effect of the representation of GE and affiliates on the representation of the debtors in possession. But whether or not there was a material adverse interest because of the relationships remained to be seen.
I do not believe this represented a problem under the disinterested standard since it involved representation of
others. But the court had to determine if disqualification was required under the adverse interest standard. It is
an example of what I discussed in Gerald K. Smith, Conflicts of Interests in Workouts and Bankruptcy
ReorganizationCases, 48 S.C. L. REv. 793, 852-53 (1997). A party in interest often prefers a friendly, or if not
friendly, at least a known adversary. Why else would GE waive the conflict when it normally takes a tough line
on waivers?
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the court concluded that there was not a substantial risk that the representational
relationships would have a material adverse effect on the representation of the
debtors.
Professor Zywicki asserts that "voices favoring change have become more
prominent in response to these high-profile cases."16 No such "voices" were
identified, and I am aware of none. The effort to do something about the
employment standards goes back to the 1980s and has nothing to do with the
recent cases discussed by Professor Zywicki. It became apparent after October
1, 1979, the effective date of the Bankruptcy Code,17 and the comprehensive
amendments to the Bankruptcy Rules, effective August 1, 1983,18 that counsel
for the debtor in possession arguably was required to meet the disinterestedness
standard. However, this significant change in reorganization practice was neither
contemplated by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States
nor discussed in the five years of Congressional hearings leading to the 1978
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. Indeed, the writer for the Fifteenth Edition
of Collier on Bankruptcy, published in 1980 shortly after the enactment of the
Code, assumed the disinterestedness standard did not apply to the employment of
professionals by the debtor in possession. 9
16. Zywicki, supranote 2, at 292.
17. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, Title IV,
§ 402(a).
18. Order of the Supreme Court of the United States (April 25, 1983), 9 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAc. 2D,
Bankruptcy Rules p. xvii (1997-98).
19. In reliance on § 1107(b), COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY concluded that the pre-Code practice remained the
same under the Code, that is, that the debtor in possession could employ professionals who were not disinterested.
Section 327(a) permits the trustee in any title 11 case to employ, with the approval of the court, one
or more attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons provided that
any person hired must not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate and must be a "disinterested person," as such term is defined in section 101 ....
Section 1107(b) states that, notwithstanding section 327(a), a person is not disqualified from
employment under section 327 by a debtor in possession solely because of that person's employment
by or representation of the debtor prior to the commencement of the case. Presumably, a person
may be employed by or represent the debtor subsequent to the filing date even though such person is
a creditor by reason of services rendered prior to the filing date for which compensation has not
been received ....
It should be noted that section 1107(b) makes reference to "representation of the debtor" to underscore the fact that counsel for the debtor prior to the commencement of the chapter 11 case is not
disqualified from representing the debtor in possession during the chapter II case.
With respect to the debtor's retention of its attorneys after the commencement of the chapter 11
case, section 1107(b) merely incorporates in the Code the distinction between retention by a trustee
and retention by a debtor in possession contained in former Chapter X Rule 10-206(a). Chapter X
Rule 10-206(a) contained the following language:
Bankruptcy Rule 215 applies to the employment, in Chapter X cases, of attorneys and accountants by a trustee, receiver, or debtor in possession. In addition, an attorney appointed to represent a trustee shall be disinterested as specified in Rule 10-202(c)(2). Notwithstanding the
foregoing, the court may, when it is in the best interest of the estate, authorize the employment
for special purposes to be set out in the order, other than to represent the trustee in conducting
the case, of an attorney who is not disinterested provided that such attorney represents or holds
no interest adverse to the estate in the matters upon which he is to be engaged.
While Chapter X Rule 10-206(a) authorized the employment of attorneys and accountants by the
debtor in possession as well as by the trustee or receiver, it mandated disinterestedness only in the
case of counsel retained by the trustee.
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
1107.03, at 1107-7-8 (15th ed. 1980) (footnotes omitted). These conclusions
remained unchanged as recently as 1990. Id. (15th ed. 1991).
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In the 1980s, Mr. Nathan Feinstein, the Chair of the Business Bankruptcy
Committee of the Business Section of the American Bar Association, created a
Task Force on Ethics, which later became the Business Bankruptcy Ethics
Subcommittee, to study and report on ethical issues in bankruptcy cases." In
1991, after several years of study and effort, with the active support of the
Business Section of the American Bar Association, the recommendations of the
Ethics Subcommittee resulted in a resolution of the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association "supporting an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code to
apply state ethical rules to the employment of counsel for the debtor in possession rather than the disinterestedness standard."2
Without any support, Professor Zywicki states that proponents of the argument
that the disinterestedness requirement affects the ability to obtain adequate representation
are not so much concerned that a debtor in possession will be forced to go without able counsel to the detriment of the estate. Instead, it appears that this concern is animated by a sense that the disinterestedness requirement falls disproportionately hard on large law firms who will often have as clients large lenders
and other creditors who the firm will be representing in other unrelated matters.22
Professor Zywicki named no such proponent and did not support his ad hominem
argument with authority or persuasive reasoning. Professor Zywicki also is
guilty of mixing apples and oranges. A state's conflict rule, which may disqualify counsel who represents another client in an unrelated matter from representing
a trustee, debtor in possession, creditors' committee, or other party in interest in
a bankruptcy case, is only indirectly related to the disinterestedness standard. 3
Professor Zywicki again attempts to prejudice the reader by referencing the
"bankruptcy ring" and the "Donovan Commission [sic]." But he again mixes
apples and oranges. William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan was appointed to investigate the administration of bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York in
1929. The report of the investigation became known as the Donovan Report. 24
20. Gerald K. Smith, Conflicts of Interest in Workouts and Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 48 S.C. L.
REv. 793, 800 n.32 (1997).
21. Id. at 800.
22. Zywicki, supra note 2, at 318.
23. In a general sense, an adverse interest is one which adversely affects the representation. If proposed
representation is adverse to someone and state conflict rules preclude the attorney from being adverse to that
person, the proposed representation is adversely affected. A classic example is In re Amdura Corp., 121 B.R.
862, 869 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990). But the issue of an adverse interest is not reached if the client in the unrelated
matter refuses to consent to the representation since state law precludes the representation absent consent.
Once there is a waiver, not only does state disqualification evaporate, so does the adverse interest since the representation is not limited by the duty of loyalty to the client in the unrelated matter. See supra notes 11-15 and
accompanying text. However, the court still must decide whether there is a material adverse interest because of
the relationship.
24. Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, Part I, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137,
at 115-18 (1973) ("Commission Report Part I"). Chapter 5 was written by me and was reprinted verbatim in
the House Report. H.R. Doc. No. 95-595, at 96-99 (1977).
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Contrary to the thrust of Professor Zywicki's discussion of the Donovan Report,
the investigation ordered by Judge Thacher and the report by Mr. Donovan are
relevant to the administration of the bankruptcy system generally, not the disinterestedness standard.2" It was another study--the Protective Committee
25. The problems which led to the appointment of William J. Donovan to investigate bankruptcy in the
Southern District of New York in 1929 had nothing to do with the standards for employment of counsel or the
disinterestedness standard of Chapter X. The Donovan Report concerned the administration of bankruptcy
cases. It recognized and clearly described the inadequacy of creditor controlled administration.
We are faced with this situation. Bankruptcy is administered by over 140 district judges, over 530
referees in bankruptcy, and an army of shifting and changing individuals consisting of some 50,000
trustees a year, together with a multitude of receivers, appraisers, attorneys, accountants, watchmen,
and others. These groups exist supposedly to aid the creditors, of whom there are at least several
millions a year. They fail in that purpose because the responsibility is divided. Judges have neither
the time, the facilities nor the training to exercise the administrative duties which have been thrust
upon them .... The great creditor body which under the Act was supposed to control, delegates its
duties to unknown collection agents and attorneys, who have solicited claims and proxies in order to
obtain control for their own ends of this vast unregulated machinery.
Creditors are not wholly to blame for this situation. Circumstances differ from those existing when
the Act was passed in 1898. With the rapid growth of the machinery of credit, creditors in bankruptcy cases are located in various parts of the country. They cannot directly participate in administration. They either take no part at all or forward their claims for filing to the first collection agent or
attorney who solicits them.
Excerpt from Donovan Report, quoted in Chapter 5 of the Commission's Report. Commission's Report Part I,
supra note 24, at 116-17. I concluded my discussion of the Donovan Report as follows:
The Report recommended the creation of a federal bankruptcy commissioner to license and supervise trustees in the principal localities; investigate complaints against unlicensed trustees and abuses
in administration; make administrative rules and supervise and coordinate the system throughout the
country; compile statistics and other data and make studies and reports, particularly in reference to
the enforcement of criminal and discharge provisions and the jurisdiction and method of compensation of referees; establish bureaus in the principal localities for the examination of the transactions
of bankrupts in nominal-asset and no-asset cases. It was suggested by some that the foregoing
would result in a separation of judicial and administrative functions and that the latter would be centralized in the commissioner. However, the Report concluded that official administration was not an
acceptable approach.
Commission Report, Part I, supra note 24, at 117-18.
The Donovan Report recommended legislative changes to the Bankruptcy Act to implement the following principles:
1. Administration should begin in every case as promptly as possible after the filing of the petition
and provision should be made for its conclusion without delay.
2. The administration of estates should be placed upon a business-like basis. Competent, trustworthy, and experienced individuals or organizations should be attracted to serve as trustees by the payment of adequate compensation for efficient service. Procedure should be simplified. The old idea
that the interest of creditors will automatically produce zealous individuals who will serve the creditors for meager pay must be discarded.
3. The courts should be relieved of administrative responsibilities and these responsibilities should
be centralized in the executive branch of the Federal Government. The creditors will not exercise
these responsibilities. Their attempted exercise by the courts has been ineffective, burdensome, and
generally inefficient, has produced a multitude of rules and legalistic formalities and has resulted in
criticism of the bench itself. Trustees should be supervised, and licensed or subject to approval, by
the executive branch of the Federal Government.
4. Creditor control should be limited to those cases in which the creditors have a genuine interest,
and in such cases their control should be made effective through committee action. Administration
in each case should be promptly begun by an approved or licensed trustee who would continue it to
its conclusion unless a substantial number of creditors wished to replace him for some other trustee
similarly approved or licensed. Representative creditor action through committees should be substituted for senseless attempts at town-meeting methods. Notices to creditors of meetings should be
where the creditors care to do so with the privilege of supervising the acts of the trustees.
5. Means should be devised to enforce the criminal and discharge provisions of the act. The thorough examination of bankrupts in all cases whether there are assets or not should be assured.
Trustees should be permitted on their own motion to interpose objections to discharges, and it
should be made their duty to do so where the facts warrant it.
House Report on the Administration of Bankruptcy Estates ("Donovan Report") (Comm. Print 1931).
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Study26--which led to the disinterestedness standard. It is apparent that Professor
Zywicki chose to discuss the Southern District's scandal in 1929 because of its
sensational nature, since it has no relevance to the disinterested standard.
26. Congress mandated the Protective Committee Study in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Then
Professor William 0. Douglas was selected as Director of the Study and to head the Department of
Reorganization of the newly created Securities and Exchange Commission. It was the eight volumes of the
Protective Committee Study which developed the image of the reorganization process embraced by Judge Jones
and Professor Zywicki. This image was vividly portrayed by a critic of the Study, Mr. Robert T. Swaine of
Cravath, Swaine & Moore.
In any financial embarrassment or disaster which may require readjustment or reorganization of a
corporate capital structure, the authors of the SEC Reports find a presumption, well nigh conclusive,
of "incompetent and faithless management," usually subject to "banker domination" whose primary
"objectives" are essentially "self-serving," "to stifle careful scrutiny of past history," to "still" claims
based on "fraud" and to "block" disclosure of "incompetency or dishonesty of managements."
The Reports would make it appear that during the many decades of the development of American
corporations and throughout the many corporate readjustments and reorganizations which have been
experienced in every period of business depression, the American investor has habitually been the
victim of fraudulent mismanagement and that neither he nor the courts have been sufficiently alive
to his plight to attempt any remedy under the familiar rules of law and equity. Against predatory
management the American investor is pictured as helpless. Indeed he is so gullible as universally to
be completely misled by the "prestige" of the "insider group." He is so unintelligent as actually to
believe that "by virtue or their familiarity with the company's affairs," those "who have managed...
during the prosperous years" may be "best qualified to discover the causes of the past difficulties of
the company and formulate a program for its future." This mental aberration of the investor is
accentuated by the fact that among the managements and bankers upon whom the investor so mistakenly relies are "prominent persons," "calculated to inspire the confidence of securityholders," and
"institutions of prominence and prestige ... accepted as financial experts." Seemingly the courts
too have been equally gullible and unintelligent in their reliance upon men whose records of accomin the business world have given them "prestige" and caused them to be accepted as
plishment
"experts."
The Reports further make it appear that corporate managements, using their "prominence and prestige," "merely as a faqade" to "conceal incompetence or a casual assumption of duties," through the
device of protective committees and the conventional machinery of reorganization, carry on a "fight
for control" in order that they may "trade in securities on the basis of inside information" and otherwise serve "conflicting interests." "Bits of patronage ... distributed judiciously into deserving
channels" further the nefarious purposes of the conspirator managements for "the desire for ...fees
is the major motivation for the organization of protective committees."
While the innocent victim, the investor, slumbers on in his ignorance, new villains approach to complete his devastation.
"Groups on the outside" scent the loot and rush into "a fierce struggle for control ... of varying
degrees of intensity in different cases, depending upon the power, ability and prestige of those who
presume to challenge the existing management and bankers."
Over the camps of both "warring factions" hover another class of vultures, members of "the select
financial bar," who have "forsaken the tradition that its members are officers of the court," have
"discarded" "professional standards" and, being organized "on the large scale of mass production,"
with "over-specialization," "officers composed of dozens of lawyers, a huge overhead and consequent artificial standards," have "monopolized" "the practice of financial law," into "relatively few
firms" and enabled themselves to set "monopolistic prices" on legal services.
Robert T. Swaine, "Democratization" of Corporate Reorganizations,38 COLUM. L. REv. 256, 257-58 (1938)
(reprinted in Commission Report Part 1,supra note 24, at 242-43 (footnotes omitted)). See pp. 112-13 and note
133 infra for a discussion of the historical events leading to the development of the disinterestedness standard.
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II.

BANKRUPTCY CODE PROVISIONS REGULATING EMPLOYMENT

The Bankruptcy Code provides inconsistent, incoherent, and incomplete guidance as to when professionals may be employed. 7 Even a cursory review of the
statutory terrain makes this apparent. Perhaps most surprising, the standard for
the employment of professionals by a disinterested trustee of professionals is
stricter than the standard for the appointment of the disinterested trustee. Sections 701(a)(1) and 1104(d) of the Bankruptcy Code require that a trustee
appointed by the U.S. Trustee in a liquidation or reorganization case be disinterested. In contrast, under § 327(a), a professional employed by the disinterested
trustee must be disinterested and cannot hold or represent an adverse interest.29
The only exception is employment for a special purpose under § 327(c).3 0
Although the disinterestedness standard requires that the trustee not have interests materially adverse to the interests of the estate, any class of creditors, or any
class of equity security holders, the adverse interest must be materially adverse,
not simply adverse as required by § 327(a). 1
Section 327(a) provides that a trustee may employ professional persons "that
do not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterest-32 A disinterested person is defined in § 101(14) of the
ed persons .
Bankruptcy Code. The definition consists of a series of provisions found in §§
101(14)(A)-(D) specifying a number of relationships which existed at or before
the filing date of the bankruptcy case.3 3 But § 101(14)(E) is general and disqualifies anyone with "an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate
or of any class of creditors or equity security holders by reason of any direct or
indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor or an investment banker or for any other reason. 3 4 Without furnishing any supporting
authority, the Jones/Zywicki Memorandum and the article by Professor Zywicki
assert that judges read materiality out of § 101(14)(E) by importing the "no
adverse interest" requirement of § 327(a) into § 101(14)(E), and that "[a]s a
result, the term 'disinterested' has come to be understood to refer to any interest
adverse to the estate, creditors, or the debtor,regardless of materiality."3 It is puzzling why this "importation" argument is made since the "no adverse interest" standard of § 327(a), which is clearly applicable, applies to personal as well as represen27. The current Bankruptcy Rules provide no guidance other than that relating to employment of relatives
of, and those having certain connections with, judges and the U.S. Trustees. FED. R. BANKR. P.5002. For
approximately eight years prior to 1983, the Rules did regulate employment in liquidation, reorganization, and
arrangement cases. See pp. 340-42 infra.
28. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(1), 1104(d) (1993 & Supp. 1997).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (1993 & Supp. 1997).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 327(c) (1993 & Supp. 1997).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (1993 & Supp. 1997).
32. Id.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(A)-(D) (1993 & Supp. 1997).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(E) (1993 & Supp. 1997). For a general discussion of these provisions, see Gerald
K. Smith, supra note 20, at 794-826.
35. Zywicki, supra note 2, at 294; Jones/Zywicki Memorandum at 2-3.
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tational interests and is not qualified by materiality," although § 327(c) provides
that under the Bankruptcy Code, representation of or employment by a creditor is
not disqualifying, 7 absent an objection by a creditor and a finding by the court
that the representation or employment creates an "actual conflict of interest."
Under the definition in § 101(14), a person is not disinterestedsimply because
of the representationof the debtor prior to the filing of the bankruptcy case.
Nonetheless, § 327(e) continues to allow the trustee to employ, for a special purpose, an attorney who represented the debtor if the attorney "does not represent
or hold any interest adverse to the debtor or to the estate with respect to the matter on which such attorney is to be employed."'
The draftsman altered the definition of disinterestedness in Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act by deleting the
per se prohibition of employment of pre-petition debtor counsel by the trustee.
Why this occurred is uncertain. The result is that pre-petition counsel for the
debtor is disqualified only if the court finds that this is an adverse interest under
the particular facts. Section 1107(b) expressly so states as to the representation
of the debtor in possession.3 9
Extreme complexity and considerable duplication result from the addition of
"insider" to the list of per se disqualifications resulting from the definition of
disinterestedness. Where several affiliated corporations have bankruptcy cases
pending, Bankruptcy Rule 1015(b) provides for joint administration of affiliate
cases. The court is directed to "give consideration to protecting creditors of different estates against potential conflicts of interest."4 If joint administration is
ordered, Bankruptcy Rule 2009 contemplates the possibility of creditors electing
a single trustee or, in the absence of an election, the appointment of a single
trustee by the U.S. Trustee. Under Rule 2009(d), a creditor or equity security
holder of one or more of the estates may seek the appointment of separate
trustees if the requesting party in interest can establish that creditors or equity
security holders of the different estates will be prejudiced by conflicts of interest
of a common trustee. However, in a number of situations, it will be impossible
to use a single trustee. Even if a trustee of a parent is not considered an equity
security holder of a subsidiary on the basis that the stock is owned in a fiduciary
capacity, the trustee of the parent would be in control of the subsidiary and therefore, an insider under § 101(31)(B)(iii) and not disinterested under § 101(14)(A).
36. The "no adverse interest" standard includes both personal and representational interests, while §
101(14)(E) literally includes only personal interests or interests held. II U.S.C. § 101(14)(E) (1993 & Supp.
1997).
37. Section 327(e) allows the trustee to employ an attorney who has represented the debtor for a special
purpose "if such attorney does not represent or hold an interest adverse to the debtor or to the estate with
respect to the matter on which such attorney is to be employed." This provision is meaningful only if § 327(a)
precludes a trustee from employing pre-petition counsel for the debtor. I U.S.C. § 327 (1993 & Supp. 1997).
However, the draftsman deleted this prohibition against the employment of counsel for the debtor contained in
the Bankruptcy Act and the pre-1983 Chapter X Bankruptcy Rules from the definition of disinterestedness in
the 1978 Code. Perhaps the draftsman believed debtor's pre-petition counsel should be disqualified, if at all,
only if counsel represented or had an adverse interest under § 327(a). Id.
38. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended by the Chandler Act of 1938, Act of June
22, 1938, § 158, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 ("Bankruptcy Act").
39. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(b) (1993 & Supp. 1997).
40. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b).
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Furthermore, upon appointment as trustee of the subsidiary, the trustee would no
longer be disinterested as far as the parent's case is concerned since § 101(2)(B)
provides that the subsidiary is an affiliate of the parent, and therefore, under §
101(31)(E), since the trustee would be in control of the affiliate, the trustee would
be an insider under § 101(31)(E) and not disinterested under § 101(14)(A).
In a major drafting gaff, the phrase "of the debtor" no longer qualifies creditor
or equity security holders. The draftsman is to be forgiven, however, since the
"appearance concept" was abandoned. This should lead courts to the conclusion
that there has to be a materially adverse interest, rather than the appearance of
one, but it has been overlooked in the cases as well as ignored by Professor
Zywicki. ' Finally, there was added to § 101(14)(E) the phrase "interests of the
estate," which causes added confusion concerning the determination of a conflict
or adverse interest and the duties of counsel."2
Regarding professionals to be employed by the debtor in possession, the only
mention of the subject is found in § 1107(b), which provides that a person is not
disqualified for employment under § 327(a) by a debtor in possession solely
because of employment by or representation of the debtor before the commencement of the case. As pointed out above, this provision of § 1107(b) was not necessary because of the deletion of attorney for the debtor from § 101(14)(D).'
The leading treatise on bankruptcy concluded that § 1107(b) evidenced an intent
that professionals employed by the debtor in possession need not be disinterested."'
Loose drafting also characterizes the statutory provisions regulating the
employment of an attorney or accountant by an "official" committee. Section
1103(b) of the Bankruptcy Code precludes representation in the same case of
"conflicting interests," but adds that representation of a creditor of the class represented by the "official" committee is not necessarily an adverse interest:
41. E.g., In re Roberts, 46 B.R. 815 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985). But see In re Creative Restaurant Management,
Inc., 139 B.R. 902 (Bankr. WD. Mo. 1992). As pointed out in In re Creative Restaurant Management, Inc.,
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility was abandoned in the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT. The Comment to Rule 1.10 of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT states that the reason

for the abandonment was that the appearance of impropriety test was too subjective and question-begging since
impropriety itself was undefined. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 cmt. (1983).
Undoubtedly, the appearance of impropriety provision was dropped from the disinterestedness standard for similar reasons in the 1978 Reform Act.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(E) (1993 & Supp. 1997).
43. I1U.S.C. § 1107(b) (1993 & Supp. 1997). Bankruptcy Code § 101(14)(D) provides as follows: "(14)
'disinterested person' means person that -... (D) is not and was not, within two years before the date of the filing of the petition, a director, officer, or employee of the debtor or of an investment banker specified in subparagraph (B) or (C) of this paragraph[J" 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(D) (1993 & Supp. 1997).
Bankruptcy Act § 158 provided as follows:
A person shall not be deemed disinterested, for the purposes of section 156 and section 157 of this
Act, if--. . .(3) he is, or was within two years prior to the date of the filing of the petition, a director,
officer, or employee of the debtor or any such underwriter, or an attorney for the debtor or such
underwriter[.]
Bankruptcy Act § 158, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840. Compare Krovit, Gan & Weber v. Michel (In re Crivello), 134
F3d 831 (7th Cir. 1998) with Michel v. Federated Department Stores, Inc. (In re Federated Department Stores,

Inc.), 44 F.3d 1310 (6th Cir. 1995).
Chapter X Rule 10-202(c)(2)(C) of the 1979 Bankruptcy Rules provided as follows: "(2) A person shall not
be deemed disinterested if ...(C) he is, or was within 2 years prior to the date of the filing of the petition, a
director, officer, or employee of the debtor or any such underwriter, or an attorney for the debtor or such underwriter[.]" Part 2, COLLIER PAMPHLET EomoTN, p. 509 (1979).
44. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 19.
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an attorney or accountant employed to represent a committee appointed under §
1102 of this title may not, while employed by such committee, represent any
other entity having an adverse interest in connection with the case. Representation of one or more creditors of the same class as represented by the committee
shall not per se constitute the representation of an adverse interest.4"
There is no requirement that the counsel or accountant for the committee be disinterested or not hold or represent an adverse interest since § 327 does not apply.
However, § 328 of the Bankruptcy Code states that
the court may deny allowance of compensation for services and reimbursement
of expenses of a professional person employed under section ... 1103 ... if, at
any time during such professional person's employment under section ... 1103.
. of this title, such professional person is not a disinterested person, or represents or holds an interest adverse to the interests of the estate with respect to the
matter on which such professional person is employed.46
The good news is that professionals, including lawyers and accountants, can be
employed by the committee even though they are not disinterested or have an
adverse interest, but the bad news is that they cannot be compensated or reimbursed for expenses if they are not disinterested or have an adverse interest. So
much for the adequacy of the employment provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
and the Jones/Zywicki position that all is well, given some modest tuning.

III. DISINTERESTEDNESS - AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
It is not possible to explore the history of insolvency reorganization in a few
paragraphs. Nonetheless, because of the revisionist efforts of Professor Zywicki,
it is important to set the record straight, even though in a general way. 7
Prior to the early 1930s, corporate reorganizations were accomplished through
the use of the equity receivership. This technique was condemned by the
Protective Committee Study since it
gave complete control of the reorganization with little or no judicial oversight,
to those who had resort to it, managed its initiation, and guided its subsequent
stages. The not infrequent, although not invariable, result, where these persons
have conflictive motives and interests, was to make this procedure an instrument
of personal benefit to them, and by that token an instrument of detriment to
creditors and stockholders.'
45. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(b) (1993 & Supp. 1997).
46. 11 U.S.C. § 327 (1993 & Supp. 1997). A debate is taking place in the cases, spurred on by the U.S.
Trustee, as to whether this seemingly clear discretionary power is inapplicable if it is later determined that the
person was not disinterested or held or represented an adverse interest. The theory is that there must be a valid
appointment in the first instance.
47. The history is explored in another part of the Commission Report, which I wrote. Commission Report
Part I, supra note 24, at 237-45.
48. Securities and Exchange Commission Report on the Study and Investigation, Personnel and Functions
of Protective and Reorganization Committees: Part I, Strategy and Techniques of Protective and Reorganization Committees 29 (May 10, 1937) ("Protective Committee Study").
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To address these concerns, the Protective Committee Study recommended an
independent trustee, one free of any "interest." Only through this independent
person could there be an impartialinvestigation of claims, pursuit of claims, and
formulation of a plan providing for those entitled to participate in the reorganized debtor. To ensure the independence of the trustee, a bright line test--the
disinterestedness standard--was formulated; this standard precluded appointment
of anyone with the specified interests or relationships the Protective Committee
had found troublesome.
At about the time then Commissioner and Director Douglas and his staff were
concluding their work, a group of lawyers, judges, and academics, who became
known as the National Bankruptcy Conference, completed a sixth draft of legislation which was introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman
Chandler."9 It recast the reorganization statutes enacted in the first half of the
1930s as Chapters X, XI and XIIV ° "Chapter X [was] a blend of the National
Bankruptcy Conference's modest suggestions for revision of § 77B and the substantial changes recommended by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The key features, participation of the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the independent trustee, were the result of Commissioner Douglas' efforts.""1
Independence of the trustee was to be assured by the disinterestedness standard. Commissioner Douglas also persuaded Congress that a disinterested attorney should be a concomitant of the disinterested trustee. 2 The trustee was to
conduct an investigation and pursue claims, operate the business, and formulate a
plan of reorganization. As a great bankruptcy lawyer, William R. Rochelle, was
fond of saying, this was all fine in theory, but it was hard to find such supermen! 3 However, since a management-controlled arrangement under Chapter XI
became the dominant reorganization vehicle, Commissioner Douglas' creation
was not much utilized. 4
Until 1938, General Order 44 regulated the employment of counsel. It provided that "no attorney for a receiver, trustee, or debtor in possession shall be
appointed" unless the court is satisfied, after adequate disclosure of "all of the
attorney's connections with the bankrupt or debtor, the creditors or any other
49. In addition to the Protective Committee Study, several Congressional investigations and the reports
thereof, the Sabath, Thacher, and McAdoo Reports, were influential to the legislative efforts of the 1930s.
50. Chapter X evolved into
a reorganization statute which furnished much needed protection and shifted control of the reorganization process away from management and the reorganizers. This was accomplished by requiring a
disinterested trustee in most cases; generally allowing all interested parties to participate in the formulation of a plan, with the disinterested trustee as the focal point; providing a source of independent advice, the Securities and Exchange Commission; and the establishment of fiduciary concepts
applicable to reorganizations.
Commission Report Part I, supra note 24, at 243-44.
51. Id. at 243.
52. In 1975, Chapter X, Rule 10-206(a), added accountants so that they, as well as attorneys, had to be disinterested to be employed by the trustee, except for a special purpose. Rule 10-206(a), COLLIER PAMPHLET
EDITION, p. 515 (1979).
53. Rochelle & Balzersen, Recommendation ForAmendment To ChapterX,46 AM. BANKR. L.J. 93 (1972).
54. Commission Report Part I, supra note 24, at 244-45.
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party in interest, and their respective attorneys," that "the attorney represents no
interest adverse to the receiver, the trustee, or the estate in the matters upon
which he is to be engaged." General Order 44 continued to apply to the employment of counsel after the 1938 Chandler Act Amendments, but Chapter X added
the requirement that counsel for the independent trustee be disinterested.
However, in Chapter X cases where the debtor continued in possession, the
lawyer for the debtor in possession only had to satisfy the no adverse interest
requirement of General Order 44.
When the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States proposed
a consolidation of Chapters X, XI, and XII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, it recommended a continuation of the disinterestedness standard for an attorney or an
accountant employed by the trustee.5" The Commission also recommended the
continuance of the special purpose exception of § 157 of Chapter X. The
Commission's only modification of the disinterestedness standard was adding the
exception that "representation of a creditor or equity security holder, other than
in the [reorganization case] not preclude an attorney ... from representing a disinterested trustee."5 6 This exception was based on what was then proposed Rule
10-206(a) of the Chapter X rules. 7 The Commission did not recommend that the
Chapter X practice be changed for counsel for the debtor in a reorganization case
when a trustee was not appointed. Although not so stated in the Commission's
Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973, the lawyer for the debtor in possession only
had to meet the no adverse interest standard of General Order 44 which was
replaced by Bankruptcy Rule 215(a), effective by October 1973.'
As drafted by the staff of the House Judiciary Committee, the 1976 draft of the
1978 Code provided that "the Trustee ... may employ one or more attorneys,
accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons that do not
hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested per55. Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973, Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States, Part II, H.R. Doc. 93-137 (1973) ("Commission Report Part II"). Proposed § 7-109 provided that:
[a]n attorney or accountant employed by a trustee shall be disinterested unless the administrator,
when it is in the best interest of the estate, authorizes the employment for a special purpose of an
attorney or an accountant who has been employed by the debtor but who represents or holds no
interest adverse to the debtor or the estate in the matters on which he is engaged.
Id. at 229. The Commission's Note I gave the following explanation:
This section is derived from § 157 of the present Act, but the requirement of disinterestedness is
imposed on accountants as well as attorneys. The elements of disinterestedness are found in §1102(22). That definition is derived from § 158 of the present Act, but qualified so that representation of a creditor or equity security holder, other than in the Chapter VII case, does not preclude an
attorney or accountant from representing a disinterested trustee. See Proposed Rule 10-206(a).
Id.
56. Id. § 1-102(22),at2-3.
57. Rule 10-206(a) provided as follows:
Bankruptcy Rule 215 applies to the employment, in Chapter X cases, of attorneys and accountants
by a trustee, receiver, or debtor in possession. In addition, an attorney appointed to represent a
trustee shall be disinterested as specified in Rule 10-202(c)(2). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the
court may, when it is in the best interest of the estate, authorize the employment for speciil purposes
to be set out in the order, other than to represent the trustee in conducting the case, of an attorney
who is not disinterested provided that such attorney represents or holds no interest adverse to the
estate in the matters upon which he is to be engaged.
Rule 10-206(a), COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION, 515 (1979).
58. Order of the Supreme Court of the United States (April 24, 1973), Part 2, COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION,
613 (1979).
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The draft also provided that representation of or employment by a

creditor was not in and of itself sufficient to disqualify and contained the special
purpose exception."
As the drafting of the 1978 Code evolved, two important events occurred
which contributed to the application of the disinterestedness standard to the
employment of professionals by the debtor in possession. First, Congress
restricted the rule-making power of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy
Rules and deleted the provision that "all laws in conflict with such rules shall be
of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect."61 As a result of
the 1983 revisions to the Bankruptcy Rules, the rules regulating the employment
of lawyers, Bankruptcy Rule 215, Chapter X Rule 10-206, Chapter XI Rule 1122 and Chapter XII Rule 12-21 were abrogated, and the revised Bankruptcy
Rules did not address the employment of professionals except in Rules 2014,
2016, and 5002. Second, Congress added as § 1107(b) that "notwithstanding
section 327(a) of this title, a person is not disqualified for employment under
section 327 of this title by debtor in possession solely because of such person's
employment by or representation of the debtor before the commencement of the
case." This provision implied that § 327 controlled the employment of counsel
for the debtor in possession.
At the time the respective Subcommittees of the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees were rewriting the Commission's Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973,
the Bankruptcy Rules regulated the employment of attorneys and accountants by
trustees and debtors in possession. The Bankruptcy Rules governing liquidations
were effective October 1, 1973."' The Rules were effective as to Chapter XII,
July 1, 1974,' and Chapters X and XII, August 1, 1975.4 Chapter 10-206(a)
required that an attorney or accountant for a trustee satisfy Bankruptcy Rule 215
and be disinterested. However, in Chapters XI and XII, and in Chapter X if no
trustee were appointed, only the no adverse interest standard of Bankruptcy Rule
215 applied."5 These Rules were consistent with the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act. However, the district court in In re Leisure Dynamics, Inc.,"
held that the draftsman of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 departed from the
Rules by providing in § 1107 of the Bankruptcy Code as follows:
59. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (1993 & Supp. 1997).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 327(c) (1993 & Supp. 1997).
61. Section 405(d) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 provided as follows:
The rules prescribed under section 2075 of title 28 of the United States Code and in effect on
September 30, 1979, shall apply to cases under title 11, to the extent not inconsistent with the
amendments made by this Act, or with this Act, until such rules are repealed or superseded by rules
prescribed and effective under such section, as amended by section 248 of this Act.
See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Title II, H.R. No. 595, § 247, at 449.
62. Order of the Supreme Court of the United States (April 24, 1973), Part 2, COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION,
1(1979).
63. Order of the Supreme Court of the United States (October 1973), Part 2, COLLIER PAMPHLET EorrION,
613 (1979).
64. Order of the Supreme Court of the United States (April 21, 1975), Part 2, COLLIER PAMPHLET EDnoN,
659 (1979).
65. See Rules 10-206(a), 11-22, and 12-21, Part 2, COLLIER PAMPHLET EDmON, 515, 613, and 680 (1979).
66. In re Leisure Dynamics, Inc., 33 B.R. 121 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983).
67. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1993 & Supp. 1997).
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(a) Subject to any limitations on a trustee serving in a case under this chapter,
and to such limitations or conditions as the court prescribes, a debtor in possession shall have all the rights, other than the right to compensation under section
330 of this title, and powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties,
except the duties specified in sections 1106(a)(2), (3), and (4) of this title, of a
trustee serving in a case under this chapter.
(b) Notwithstanding section 327(a) of this title, a person is not disqualified for
employment under section 327 of this title by a debtor in possession solely
because of such person's employment by or representation of the debtor before
the commencement of the case. 7

The district court found the language of § 1107 clear, but nonetheless referred
to the Senate Report.
This section places a debtor in possession in the shoes of a trustee in every way.
The debtor is given the rights and powers of a Chapter 11 trustee. He is
required to perform the functions and duties of a Chapter 11 trustee (except the
investigative duties). He is also subject to any limitations on a Chapter 11
trustee, and to such other limitations and conditions as the court describes.'

The district court concluded that this restatement of § 1107(a) evidenced
Congressional intent to have the disinterested standard apply. The court did not
consider Chapter X § 188 which was the source of § 1107(a). Section 188 provided that the debtor in possession was "vested with all the rights,

. . .

subject to

all the duties, and exercise[d] all the powers of a trustee ....
69 This was nearly
identical to § 1107(a), but no court ever held that § 188 of Chapter X required
disinterestedness on the part of counsel for the debtor in possession.70
Nonetheless, the Jones/Zywicki Memorandum and the article by Professor
Zywicki assume that the language of the Bankruptcy Act is to be interpreted differently when used in the Code. Professor Zywicki brushes aside the suggestion
68. In re Leisure Dynamics, Inc, supra note 66, at 122-23 (quoting from S.REP.No. 95-989, at 116 (1978)).
69. A debtor continued in possession of its property shall have all the title, be vested with all the
rights, be subject to all the duties, and exercise all the powers of a trustee appointed under this chapter, subject, however, at all times to the control of the judge and to such limitations, restrictions,
terms and conditions as the judge may from time to time prescribe.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 188.
70. The draftsmen of the Chandler Act Amendments used a drafting convention in Chapters X and
XI. Rather than providing separate rules for trustee and debtor in possession, Chapters X and XI
provided that the debtor in possession was given the powers of a trustee. In Chapter X the debtor in
possession was 'vested with all the rights,... subject to all the duties, and exercise[d] all the powers
of a trustee . . . .' Chapter XI provided that the debtor in possession had the title and could 'exercise
all the powers of a trustee .....
Gerald K. Smith, Disinterestedness, ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 641 (William L. Norton, Jr., ed.,
1995-96) (footnotes omitted).
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that there was a drafting problem. Whether a drafting error7" or not, the fact is
that the change was never debated or discussed and therefore, not thought
through carefully. It is time that we do so.
The per se disqualification of a professional who is a creditor, officer, director,
employee, or insider has caused great difficulty, especially as far as the retention
of pre-petition counsel for the debtor as counsel for the debtor in possession is
concerned. As recognized by Judge Jones and Professor Zywicki, there is no justification for a per se disqualification of debtor's pre-petition counsel because of
creditor status unless the claim is of a size or nature that would materially affect
the representation. However, applied "rigidly" or literally, as they suggest, the
disinterestedness standard disqualifies anyone who is unpaid for any work up to
the filing of the petition, even though adequately secured by a cash retainer taken
before the filing. The First Circuit struggled with this absurdity in In re Martin"
and simply ignored the statute.
71. The drafting error was the addition of § 1107(b). Although obviously intended to assure that pre-petition counsel for the debtor would not be disqualified from representing the debtor as debtor in possession, a
possible inference from § 1107(b) is that the disinterested standard applies to counsel for the debtor in possession.
Nowhere in the Code or the legislative history is it expressly provided that counsel for a debtor in
possession must be disinterested. But somewhere along the way a drafting problem arose. The
Senate staff added to the section dealing with the rights, powers and duties of a debtor in possession
subparagraph (b), innocuous in and of itself, which provided that "[n]otwithstanding section 327(a)
of this title, a person is not disqualified for employment under section 327 of this title by a debtor in
possession solely because of such person's employment by or representation of the debtor before the
commencement of the case."
In the final debates on the legislation, the Senate staff prevailed as to the new provision and there
was also inserted "a technical amendment contained in the Senate amendment indicating that an
attorney for the debtor in possession is not disqualified for compensation for services and reimbursement of expenses simply because of prior representation of the debtor." This was accomplished by inserting a cross reference in § 328(c) to § 1107(b). The Joint Legislative Statement did
not state or even imply that counsel for the debtor in possession must be disinterested. Nor did the
Joint Legislative Statement discuss the reason for the inclusion from the Senate Bill of what became
§ 1107(b), which provided that a person was not disqualified to represent a debtor in possession
"solely because of such person's employment, by or representation of the debtor before the commencement of the case."
Until the inclusion of the provision from the Senate Bill, there was no possible inference that counsel for the debtor in possession must be disinterested. It can be inferred, however, from § 1107(b)
that Congress intended to bring the employment of counsel for the debtor in possession under § 327.
Nonetheless, in light of the prior practice, a more plausible interpretation is that the amendments
were intended to negate the possibility that prefiling counsel for the debtor might be considered to
have a materially adverse interest and thus be disqualified from acting as counsel for the debtor in
possession. But as a result of the draftsmen carving out one exception, it can be inferred that the
disinterestedness requirement otherwise applies. Such interpretation ignores the status of the law
prior to October 1, 1979, the effective date of the Bankruptcy Code, and the absence of any express
statutory provision overruling the prior law. There is also a lack of any legislative history suggesting
a disinterestedness requirement for counsel for the debtor in possession. Surely such a dramatic
change would not have been done in such a delicate way. It would have been controversial and
widely discussed. A canon of construction often invoked by the Supreme Court of the United States
is that the rules that were established under the Bankruptcy Act continue unless explicitly repealed
or modified. That is not the situation as to § 1107(b). Even the legislative history is silent.
Nonetheless, the Bankruptcy Bench assumes that counsel for a debtor in possession must be disinterested.
Id, at 642-44 (footnotes omitted).
72. In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1987).
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The problem with the "creditor disqualification" rule is dramatically evidenced
by In re Sharon Steel Corp.73 In Sharon Steel, the district court upheld the bankruptcy court's authorization of the employment of Price-Waterhouse as accountant and financial advisor to the debtor even though Price-Waterhouse was a prepetition creditor of the debtor holding a claim approximating $875,000. The U.S.
Trustee objected to the application to employ Price-Waterhouse and appealed to
the district court and then to the circuit court. The bankruptcy and district courts
characterized the situation as follows:
Price-Waterhouse is most familiar with the debtors' accounting system and systems in operations. It assisted the debtor in preparation for the preliminary
hearing on the use of cash collateral in early December. Following that hearing,
the debtors' motion to use cash collateral was interimly denied, but the debtor
was given an opportunity to revise its business plan and to present further evidence of its ability to operate profitably at a final cash collateral hearing ....
The debtor requires the expertise of Price-Waterhouse to develop and present its
revised business plan.
Even if the debtor had the capability of engaging an accounting firm to replace
Price-Waterhouse, it would be extraordinarily expensive and take a substantial
length of time to become familiar with the debtor's needs.
The debtor had no cash to pay a retainer to a new firm and it is unlikely that a
new firm could be engaged without a retainer given the serious possibility that
this estate will have no funds with which to pay administrative expenses.
Further, the debtor is under time constraints to complete its work and present it
to the court.
The economic realities of this case make Price-Waterhouse's appointment
imperative. No harm to any other party has been alleged or can be shown ....
Clearly, the failure to appoint Price-Waterhouse would jeopardize any hope the
debtor has of presenting a business plan demonstrating that the debtor has any
chance at reorganization.74
The district court also observed that Price-Waterhouse had stated in its affidavit that it would not participate as an unsecured creditor in the Chapter XI case

or vote its claim in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The official
committee of unsecured creditors had voted unanimously to support the retention
of Price-Waterhouse and the secured lenders did not object, stating that "the cost
73. United States Trustee v. Price-Waterhouse (In re Sharon Steel Corp.), 154 B.R. 53 (Bankr. WD. Penn.
1993).
74. Id. at 55 (citing In re Sharon Steel Corp., 152 B.R. at 450) (footnotes omitted). Mr. Herb Minkel,
counsel for the debtor, has informed the author that Mr. John Logan, then Executive Director of the Office of
the U.S. Trustee, appealed to the Third Circuit in the anticipation that the Circuit would affirm, thus allowing
the U.S. Trustee to be more flexible in its application of the disinterestedness standard.
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to replace Price-Waterhouse would probably be prohibitive." The only objection
was that of the U.S. Trustee. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the Code's
disinterested standard clearly precluded employment of a creditor.7"
Given a little more maneuvering room, the Third Circuit came up with a sensible interpretation of the disinterestedness provision concerning affiliates. In In
re BH&P, Inc.," the issue was whether a single trustee and a single trustee's
counsel could represent the corporation and the principals in three related
Chapter 7 cases.77 The Third Circuit concluded that the trustee was not disqualified under the disinterestedness standard since any claim was held in a representational capacity and the trustee was not a creditor for purposes of the disinterestedness standard.7
If we were to hold that the trustee, who succeeds to a debtor's property interests
by operation of law, thereby becomes a "creditor," every trustee who files a
proof of claim on behalf of a creditor, a practice specifically allowed by 11
U.S.C. § 501(c), would automatically be disqualified from serving. We do not
believe that section 101(14) can or should be read to disqualify trustees because
of action taken in a representative capacity. That section was, in our view,
intended to mandate disqualification based on personal status, e.g., where those
implicated are themselves creditors of the debtor or where they personally "have
an interest" which is "materially adverse" under subparagraph (E).79

As far as counsel was concerned, the Third Circuit noted that § 327(c) requires
an actual conflict of interest; but, since the bankruptcy court found an actual conflict of interest, a majority of the panel upheld the bankruptcy court's finding as
not clearly erroneous. Judge Hutchinson dissented on the basis there was not a
75. United States Trustee v. Price-Waterhouse, 19 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1994).
76. In re BH&P, Inc., 949 E2d 1300 (3rd Cir. 1991).
77. The bankruptcy court constructed a presumption in favor of disqualification arising from certain facts
being present.
Finally, the bankruptcy court held that in related cases it is presumptively improper to appoint a single trustee or creditors' committee, appoint the same counsel for a trustee, creditors' committee or
debtor in possession, or to permit the same management for two or more debtors in possession in
any of the following circumstances where:
(a) creditors of the debtors have dealt with debtors as an economic unit;
(b) the affairs of the debtors are substantially entangled;
(c) assets have been transferred from one debtor to another in transactions that are not at arms
length;
(d) piercing the corporate veil of one of the debtors may be necessary or advisable; or
(e) one estate has claims against the other.
Id. at 1305. This presumption was held to be rebuttable only in the case of "a potential conflict of interest,
[where] no other competent fiduciary or professional is available, or the possibility that the conflict will
become actual is remote and circumstances make use of a common fiduciary and professionals particularly
compelling." Id.
78. Id. at 1308-09.
79. Id. at 1309.
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present conflict of interest, but only the possibility of a conflict, and when, if
ever, the conflict materialized, it could be handled by the appointment of special
counsel.8 0
The Third Circuit also had an interesting comment concerning the 1984
amendment to § 327(c) which introduced the phrase "actual conflict of interest."
The majority concluded that
prior to the 1984 amendments, the Code made no provision for counsel's simultaneous representation of a debtor and a creditor. The 1984 amendments represent a return to the pre-Code rule which provided that a trustee was authorized
to retain counsel who also represented a creditor, but only in circumstances
80. Id. at 1318-1323.
The joint administration of all three estates had continued in an orderly manner for almost one year
after the trustee filed the protective proofs of claim and nondischargeability complaints against the
Herman and Berkow estates. Then, the trustee and his counsel, just before the removal proceedings
began, filed an adversary proceeding on behalf of BH & P. By it, they sought to avoid, to the extent
of $1,300,000.00, the secured status of the Bank of New York's lien on BH & P's assets for a debt
said to be in excess of $10,000,000.00. Even if only the remaining $8,700,000.00 of the
$10,000,000.00 debt the Bank of New York claims is secured by its lien on BH & P's assets, the liquidation of the Bank's lien is likely to exhaust all the known assets of the three estates. Accordingly,
any conflict between the three estates that might be occasioned by the claims Maggio and his counsel filed for BH & P against the Herman and Berkow estates has not yet arisen and it is unlikely that
it ever will. At best, the filing of the claims creates a future, not a present, conflict of interest, and
the facts, as known at this time, are simply not sufficient to warrant a conclusion that this future
conflict is material enough to warrant disqualification of either the trustee or his counsel or a denial
of fees for work performed on the Herman and Berkow estates before disqualification. Considering
the likelihood, or rather the lack of likelihood, that any BH & P recovery from the Herman and
Berkow estates could significantly affect the rights of other creditors of the three estates, I think that
the bankruptcy court's finding of an existing material conflict requiring removal is clearly erroneous.
Finally, I note that this Court's opinion on the merits of this appeal sets forth a new standard for
evaluating the effect of conflicts of interest on the joint administration of related bankruptcy estates.
It gleans that standard from the decision of the United States Court of Appeal for the First Circuit in
In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1987). Under that newly announced standard, I would remand
this case to the bankruptcy court for careful consideration of the following principle:
The naked existence of a potential for conflict of interest does not render the [arrangement]
nugatory, but makes it voidable as the facts may warrant. It is for the [bankruptcy] court to
decide whether the [arrangement] carries with it a sufficient threat of material adversity to
warrant prophylactic action ....
[H]orrible imaginings alone cannot be allowed to carry the day.
Id. at 182-83 (quoted in In re BH&P, Inc., 949 F.2d at 1312-13).
In considering this standard, I think the bankruptcy court might well conclude that the requisite
"threat of material adversity" is absent from this record. Indeed, the bankruptcy court specifically
found that there was no evidence that the interim trustee or his counsel failed to vigorously pursue
the interests of all three estates. If sufficient assets are recovered, other steps such as the appointment of special counsel could resolve any conflict at that time. See In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs.,
Inc., 16 B.R. 932, 939-40 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). "To act earlier in a preemptive manner could
result in confusion and interruption of the orderly administration of . . . bankruptcy proceedings
and cause ... unnecessary great expense." Id. at 939. The bankruptcy court's finding of an actual
conflict also ignores the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code which shows that joint administration of estates is preferred whenever it is cost efficient. See 13A COLLIER ON BANxRUPTcY T 10115.04 (14th ed. 1977). Joint administration serves to ameliorate proliferation of trustees and attorneys whose separate fees can inflate administrative expenses to the detriment of other creditors.
In re BH&P, Inc., 949 F.2d 1300, 1322-23 (3rd Cir. 1991) (footnotes omitted).
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where it was absolutely necessary. The existence of interdebtor claims is, therefore, no longer . . . automatic ground for disqualification of counsel for the
trustee. Section 327 focuses the inquiry upon whether there is an actual conflict
of interest. "1
The absolute necessity requirement was not a requirement of Rule 10-206.
The note to the Rule did, however, state that
[i]f other competent attorneys are available, the trustee's attorney should be
selected from that group. This exception should be utilized only in the case
where there is real need. And even if such an attorney is considered, it remains
important to determine8 2whether he is disqualified on any other ground for having an adverse interest.
Is there any logical reason for disqualification because counsel is a pre-petition
creditor of the debtor? A secured claim may. be troublesome and constitute a
material adverse interest, but when could an unsecured claim give rise to a conflict or adverse interest? Perhaps from the perspective of management or ownership, but Judge Jones and Professor Zywicki do not suggest this as a reason. If
the claim were large enough, it might represent a real concern to equity and,
therefore, be disqualifying under § 101(14)(E). But surely the fact that a professional holds an unsecured claim is not threatening to unsecured creditors.
In In re Diamond Mortgage Corp., special counsel was appointed to handle
foreclosures. The special counsel did not disclose a pre-petition claim. Judge
Ginsberg found that special counsel "embarked on a scheme designed to get his
pre-petition debt repaid."8
At certain times in the cases, Platek was being compensated by this court for his
foreclosure work at a rate of $450 per foreclosure. At other times, he was being
paid a flat rate of $45 an hour. At no time was he ever being paid a rate of $75
per hour. Nevertheless, in numerous foreclosure cases, Platek falsely swore to
various s;tate court judges that he was being paid a rate of $75 an hour for
Diamond foreclosures. The state court judges would routinely award him fees
in that amount. Those fees would then be added to the foreclosure judgment
pursuant to the mortgage instruments. When the property foreclosed or was
sold and the judgment was paid off, Platek would take the difference between
the $75 an hour state court award and the $45 an hour rate or the $450 flat rate
he was allowed by this court and apply it to reduce his pre-petition debt. Platek
never informed the state court of this practice. Once he did seek to have the
practice ratified by this court, but that motion was denied. He nevertheless continued his prior practice even after that motion was denied. 8
81. Id. at 1314. Clearly, a court following the Third Circuit in its in re BH&P Inc. decision would also
conclude that representation of a creditor in unrelated matters would not be disqualifying, absent an actual conflict of interest. Surely, the lesser is included in the greater.
82. Rule 10-206, COLLIER, supra note 57, at 515.
83. In re Diamond Mortgage Corp., 135 B.R. 78 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990).
84. Id. at 85.
85. Id.
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Judge Ginsberg observed in a footnote to his opinion that what counsel did confirmed "the wisdom of the requirement that all professionals retained under
§ 327(a) not be pre-petition creditors."8 If Judge Ginsberg is correct, courts are
wrong in allowing waivers. A better approach would be to agree, as did PriceWaterhouse in the Sharon Steel case, that it would not participate during the case
or vote its claim. For those cynical about lawyers, logically waiver has a greater
tendency to cause a person to try to recoup the loss of his claim than would participation in the pay out to creditors.
Another problem with the statutory regime is the lack of guidance as to when
an interest or representation is adverse to the estate. There is also a partial overlap of the § 327(a) adverse interest standard with the material adverse interest
standard of § 101(14)(E). Which controls? Overlap occurs as to the phrase
"interest materially adverse to the interests of the estate," and it is a narrow overlap in that it only concerns those interests arising from "any direct or indirect
relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor or an investment
banker," although the catch-all, "for any other reason," could be interpreted literally to make the overlap complete. If the no interest adverse to the estate standard of § 327(a) controls, the only effective role for § 101(14)(E) is as to "an
interest materially adverse to ...any class of creditors or equity security holders."
In those instances, the court should employ a materiality standard since § 327(a)
does not reach those situations. Another difficulty is the use of the amorphous
phrase "estate." It is an undefined term and perhaps means no more than property and avoiding powers. If so, the adverse interest standard only relates to representational or personal interests in conflict with the assets and powers of the
estate. Of course, that does include a lot of territory.
As I have observed elsewhere, the courts have had difficulty applying the
adverse interest standard. There are a number of definitions in the case law. 87
The result is a lack of uniformity and uncertainty. This has an impact beyond the
litigated cases that come to the attention of the newspapers, academics, and
judges. It affects what happens in the day-to-day practice; it has a significant
impact on choice of counsel. It also substantially increases expenses since new
counsel must represent the debtor. Another consequence of uncertainty and lack
of uniformity is disqualification and the resulting economic loss and adverse
publicity, not only to the professionals involved, but also to the bankruptcy system, including the judiciary.
IV

DISINTERESTEDNESS AND THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION

The National Bankruptcy Review Commission took on the task of looking at
employment standards, in part because of the resolution of the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association recommending the elimination of the
disinterestedness standard for counsel for the debtor in possession and the substi86. Id. at 94, n.12.
87. See Smith, supra note 20, at 796-99.
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tution therefore of the otherwise applicable state professional standards. By the
time the Review Commission was operational, the National Bankruptcy
Conference had joined those recommending change. "
The nine-person Commission, by vote of six in favor 89 and two opposed,9"
dropped the ball on any meaningful reform of the Bankruptcy Code with respect
to employment of professionals. Professor Zywicki's November revisions to his
article attribute the fact that no meaningful recommendations were made by the
Review Commission to the Review Commission initially recommending the disinterestedness standard be abandoned for professionals employed by the debtor
in possession.
Unfortunately, careful consideration of many of these pragmatic reforms was
headed-off by the Commission's initial decision to abandon disinterestedness
completely. This action effectively precluded a more careful review of disinterestedness and its requirements until the more general question was resolved. By
the time the Commission finally revisited the issue and decided to recommend
the retention of disinterestedness, it lacked the time and resources to undertake a
more detailed review of these particular issues.
As a result of these forces, the Commission was able to take action only on the
most pressing problems and least controversial amendments which had been
proposed, as reflected in the proposed changes in § 1107. The Commission's
rash decision to call for the elimination of the disinterestedness requirement for
professionals for a debtor in possession unfortunately foreclosed an opportunity
for meaningful review of further reforms.91
Professor Zywicki is mistaken, as the following summary of the work of the staff
and advisors to the Commission, as well as the opposition of Judge Jones, makes
clear.
A. Review Commission Working Group on Service to the Estate and Ethics
The Commission had a capable Working Group. It consisted of Commissioners Ginsberg and Butler, Senior Adviser Professor Lawrence P. King, and Staff
Attorney Elizabeth Holland. Participants invited to discuss relevant issues
included Professor Charles W Wolfram, the Reporter for the Restatement, practicing lawyers Don Bernstein, Michael Bloom, Susan Freeman, Barney Shapiro,
and the author. Mr. John R. Byrnes sat in as the representative of the Executive
Office of the U.S. Trustee. The Working Group and participants had working
88. The NBC recommended that the Bankruptcy Code be amended to provide that counsel for the debtor in
possession need not meet the disinterestedness standard, but must not hold or represent an adverse interest, and
that adverse interest be defined in a manner similar to conflict of interest in § 201 of the Restatement.
89. Commissioners Butler, Ceccotti, Gose, Hartley, Jones and Shepard, NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW
COMMISSION RESULTS OF SECOND MAIL BALLOT (August 5, 1997) (on file with author).
90. Commissioners Ginsberg and Alix. Id.
91. Zywicki, supra note 2, at 324.
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sessions July 18-19, 1996, in Washington, D.C., September 18, 1996, in Santa
Fe, New Mexico; December 17, 1996, in Washington, D.C.; and January 22-23,
1997, in Washington, D.C. The Working Group explored a number of issues,92
but the Working Group's work was cut short at admission to practice, the disinterestedness standard, and a definition of adverse interest. 3 The Working Group
recommended to the Commission that the disinterestedness standard be abandoned as to those employed by the debtor in possession, but be retained as to
92. The Service to the Estate & Ethics Issues List consisted of the following:
Should the existence of a material adverse impact be the only grounds for disqualification to represent, or receive compensation from, the estate? Should a definition of material adverse interest be
included in the Bankruptcy Code?
Should the "disinterestedness" standard be relaxed? Should professionals with existing relationships with their clients be able to serve as counsel to the debtor in possession?
Who are the "professionals" who should be supervised by the court? Management consultants?
Media relations advisors? Lobbyists? Surveyors? Appraisers? Real Estate Brokers? Should parties be able to waive disinterestedness requirements?
Are potential, rather than actual, tonflicts sufficient to disqualify counsel? Should the standard be
different for section 327(a) counsel versus section 327(e) counsel?
Should rules enacted in the Bankruptcy Code supersede local regulation under canons of ethics and
disciplinary rules? How should conflicts of interest be defined for application to the engagement
and compensation of professionals?
When should multiple professionals be required to represent multiple, related parties and when can
such parties be represented by one professional? Should certain inter-company relationships affect
this result?
Does the disqualification of an individual in a law firm disqualify the entire firm? Do "Chinese
walls" work in bankruptcy? What criteria should judges use to approve applications for professional
compensation? Should fees be judged by local or national standards? Should routine hold-backs be
approved? Are lodestars appropriate? Are other compensation schemes more likely to produce an
efficient system? Does the appointment of a fee examiner help the process or does an examiner
usurp the judge's role and drive up the cost to the professional? Do requirements for local counsel
drive up costs? Should they be abolished? Or do they reduce costs by demanding representation by
counsel familiar with local court practices?
Service to the Estate and Ethics Proposal #3: Nationwide Admission to Practice (revised for Jan. 22, 1997,
meeting).
93. The proposal as to the national admissions rule was that
[a]dmission to practice in one bankruptcy court, usually by virtue of being admitted to practice in
the relevant United States District Court, should entitle an attorney, on presentation of a certificate
of admission and good standing in another bankruptcy court, to appear in the other bankruptcy court
in the United States without the need for any other admission procedure.
Id. Even this recommendation was watered down in the form approved by the Commission so as to leave intact
local rules requiring local counsel:
Admission to practice in one bankruptcy court, usually by virtue of being admitted to practice in the
relevant United States District Court, should entitle an attorney, on presentation of a certificate of
admission and good standing in another district court, to appear in the other bankruptcy court without the need for any other admission procedure. The proposal will not affect requirements (if any)
to associate with local counsel. Similarly, the proposal will not change the requirements under state
law governing the practice of law and the maintenance of an office for the practice of law. The proposal will only amend the local bankruptcy rule or practice requirements governing special admission of attorneys to the bankruptcy court who are otherwise not admitted to the bar of the district
court in the district where the bankruptcy court is located.
National Bankruptcy Review Commission, PROPOSALS INITIALLY ADOPTED BY THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY

REVIEW COMMISSION, 4 (revised April 29, 1997). The Admission Rule drafted by Professor Coquillette for the
Circuit Courts of Appeals does not require local counsel. Daniel Coquillette, Study of Federal Cases Involving
FederalRules of Appellate Procedure 46, STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT (July 19-20, 1997), published in
WORKING PAPERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE -

SPECIAL STUDIES OF FEDERAL

RULES GOVERNING ATTORNEY CONDUCT, App. III, 259 (A.O. Sept. 1997) ("Working Papers").
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those employed by the trustee." Concerning the definition of adverse interest,
the Working Group recommended that the Commission give serious consideration to the adoption of the language worked out by the reporters and participants
in the process of creating the Restatement, which basically identified a conflict
of interest or an adverse interest in the Code terminology as a representational or
personal interest which resulted in a substantial risk of a material and adverse
effect on the representation. It was believed that this would give the courts guidance. Under this approach, a lawyer who is a pre-petition creditor of the debtor
might very well be disqualified, not under a per se rule, but because of a significant interest, whether as a result of the amount or the nature of -the claim. On
October 19, 1996, the Commission adopted the first proposal of the Working
Group that:
Professionals retained by a debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 case should not
have to meet the disinterestedness requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). The deletion does not change the requirement that such professionals (i) not have any
interest materially adverse to the estate or (ii) disclose all potential conflicts to
the court.95
However, the proposal was revoked at a Commission Meeting in June 1997, and
by a mail ballot August 5, 1997, by a vote of six to two. The following alternative language for Proposal No. 1 was adopted:
Section 1107(b), which authorizes an exception to the disinterestedness/conflict
of interest standards for professionals in Chapter 11 cases, should be modified
as follows:
(b) Notwithstanding § 327(a) of this title, a person is not disqualified for
employment under § 327 of this title by a debtor in possession solely because of
such person's employment by or representation of the debtor before the commencement of the case, or solely because of such person ' being the holder of
an insubstantialunsecuredclaim againstor equity interest in the debtor. 6

As a result of the April Jones/Zywicki Memorandum, the Commission and its
staff did not pursue other issues or the adverse interest definition proposal of the
Working Group:
94. The Jones/Zywicki memorandum makes much of the fact that the Commission's initial recommendation, and the proposal of the Working Group, eliminated the disinterestedness standard as to professionals
employed by the debtor in possession. Somehow, it was concluded that the failure to extend the recommendation to the trustee indicated a flaw in the approach. That is really grasping at straws. Problems had not been
encountered in practice with the disinterestedness standard of counsel for the trustee. It is rare that the trustee
seeks to employ anyone having any relationship to the debtor, except in a special role. Nonetheless, it would
make sense to eliminate the disinterestedness standard as to the trustee in all likelihood; it no longer serves a
useful purpose and the independence of counsel would be adequately assured by the no material adverse interest standard which would apply across the board.
95. National Bankruptcy Review Commission, PROPOSALS INITIALLY ADOPTED BY THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, 4 (revised Apr. 29, 1997).
96. Service to the Estate & Ethics Ballot, supra note 92.
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The Bankruptcy Code should define conflict of interest for purposes of retention of professionals under section 327. A professional has a conflict of interest
if there is a substantial risk that such professional's representation will be materially and adversely affected by the professional's own interests or by the professional's duties to another person that currently employs or formerly employed
such professional, or a third person. The proposal does not affect a professional's duty under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014 to disclose "all connections with the
debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and
accountants, the United States trustee, or any person employed in the office of
the United States trustee."97
B. Jones/Zywicki Memorandum
The Jones/Zywicki Memorandum was distributed by Judge Jones by letter
dated April 29, 1997. Several months later, the Commission reversed itself, concluding that there should only be a modest tinkering with the disinterestedness
standard. This about face was occasioned by the Memorandum authored by
Judge Jones and Professor Zywicki. In summary, Jones/Zywicki argued that
"strict disinterestedness standards are necessary because of the unique pressures
raised by the bankruptcy process;"'98 "disinterestedness . . . is critical to the
preservation of public and judicial confidence in the integrity of the bankruptcy
system;" 99 and "a strict adherence to disinterestedness is necessary ... to ensure
consistency between the ethical rules of the Bankruptcy Code and the various
state ethical rules." 100
The first argument is articulated in the Jones/Zywicki Memorandum as follows:
The trustee and his professionals are required to act as a fiduciary for the estate,
its creditors, other parties in interest, and the court, and not solely as his advocate. The disinterestedness standard, therefore, is designed to insure that all
issues relevant to the administration of the estate are properly raised and vented
before the court. As such, a strict disinterestedness standard is designed to
eliminate any conflicts that might cause the trustee and his professionals to
favor one party over another, to "take it easy" on one creditor or group of creditors, or to refuse to pursue possible claims or avenues of inquiry because of any
direct or indirect pressures. 1
There are several errors in this statement. Under applicable ethical rules, the
lawyer is a fiduciary for the client, not an amorphous and unknown "estate,"
creditors, or other parties in interest. The disinterestedness standard is not

97. Memorandum from Prof Lawrence King to National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Prof. Elizabeth
Warren and Stephen H. Case, 4 (Apr. 28, 1997) (on file with author).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 5.
100. Id.
101. Memorandum from Judge Jones to National Bankruptcy Review Commission, 4 (Apr. 21, 1997) (on
file with author).
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designed to see that all issues are vented before the court, but rather to preclude
persons with certain associations from representing the trustee and to assure that
a person employed does not have a personal, as distinguished from representational, interest, which creates a material adversity in regard to the interests of the
estate, any class of creditors, or any class of equity security holders, occasioned
by any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in the debtor
or an investment banker, or for any other reason.
As far as the second argument is concerned, the standard of disinterestedness
no longer promotes public confidence. It was designed by Director Douglas to
wrest control from insiders, their bankers, and attorneys, but under the Bankruptcy Code, the insiders are left in control. Avoiding material conflicts of interconfidence; litigating over immaterial reasons for disqualifiest promotes public
102
not.
does
cation
It is perplexing why the retention of the disinterestedness standard is so important to Judge Jones. However, some insight is given in her assertion that
"because the debtor in possession has inherent conflicts of interest and is by def102. A good example is United States Trustee v. S.S. Retail Stores Corporation (In re S.S. Retail Stores
Corp.), 211 B.R. 699 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.1979).
The Trustee alleges Calof is disqualified under section 327 because, as a former officer of the
Debtor's Board of Directors, he fails to qualify as a non-disinterested party pursuant to section
101(14). The Debtor alleges Calof performed his duties as Assistant Secretary on the Debtor's
Board of Directors within his role as attorney for the Debtor, his duties were negligible, and he
should not be bound under section 101(14) as an officer.
The court initially ruled Calof was not disqualified based on his former position as Assistant
Secretary. The court retracted that ruling at the June 20, 1996, hearing, finding instead that Calof's
position as Assistant Secretary precluded his participation as Debtor's counsel under section 327 as
a matter of California law. However, the court specifically did not find Calof to be disqualified, but
instead assumed he was, and further found his disqualification was not attributable to the firm.
The Bankruptcy Code does not define the term "officer." Under California law, the by-laws of the
Board of Directors are controlling. California Corporation Code ("Cal.Corp.Code") § 312(a) provides, "[a] corporation shall have a chairman of the board ...and other officers with such titles and
duties ... determined by the board and as may be necessary to enable it to sign instruments and
share certificates ...?' A review of the Debtor's by-laws indicates the Board elected Calof as
Assistant Secretary, and in that capacity he signed share certificates. At the hearing on the Trustee's
renewed objection the court noted, in concluding that it appeared Calof was disqualified:
Mr. Calof had no express delegated duties in the corporation's bylaws or even in the minutes,
but as a practical matter, had participated in the signing of stock certificates, and that that was
his basic duty, was to sign stock certificates or co-sign them, that he didn't have any management or business authority, didn't have any voting authority, no discretion, other than discretion as a lawyer, as far as the Debtor's business affairs, and that he was not compensated for
signing the certificates beyond what the firm received in legal compensation.
Under Cal. Corp. Code § 312, the fact that Calof did not receive compensation, nor vote, is not an
issue in determining his status as an officer. Pursuant to California law, Calof was an officer of the
Debtor within two years of the filing of bankruptcy; he is not a "disinterested" person under section
327(a) and is disqualified from representing the Debtor.
At the hearing on the Trustee's renewed objection on June 20, 1996, the court found the law in
California indicated a strong public policy toward vicarious disqualification, but held that due to the
circumstances in this case it was not applicable. The court noted this issue was not the typical "conflict of interest-adverse interest" type of case where disqualification of the entire firm is necessary:
[B]ut here we're not talking about any-Mr. Calof having represented any adverse interests to
the Debtor; he's been on the Debtor's team all along, remains on the Debtor's team. There's no
danger that he knows something that's contrary to the Debtor's interests.
Id. at 701-02.
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inition not disinterested, this may caution in favor of requiring an even stricter
adherence to disinterestedness for the debtor in possession's professionals than
for a disinterested trustee." ' 3
A number of judges make of the debtor in possession what it is not. For example, Judge Allen, a bankruptcy judge for the District of Utah, criticized counsel
for the debtor in possession in In re Bonneville Pacific Corp. for not initiating an
investigation of past and current management for fraud.1" 4 Presumably, this view
is shared by Judge Jones and Professor Zywicki. Certainly, their view of counsel
suggests that counsel has a duty to do something about mismanagement and
insider fraud. However, this ignores the delicate balance struck in the creation of
Chapter 11. Under § 1104(a)(1), parties in interest are entitled to seek the
appointment of an independent trustee or an examiner if there has been fraud,
dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement by current management,
either before or after the commencement of the case. Under §§ 1106(a)(3) and
(4), a trustee (and examiner if so ordered) has the power and duty to investigate
the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor and file
a statement of any such investigation, including any fact ascertained pertaining to
fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity in
the management of the affairs of the debtor. Section 1107(a), however, carves
out of the functions and duties to be performed by a debtor in possession the
duties specified in §§ 1106(a)(3) and (4). If this is the wrong approach, and it
may well be, we need to rethink the process of reorganization and revise the
statute. Courts should not do so on an ad hoe basis, however.
I support the use of an independent trustee in major reorganizations. Short of
this, I support the continuation of management with an independent person (the
label is unimportant) appointed to formulate a fair plan consistent with the
Congressional standards. My earlier rudimentary thoughts along these lines
were shaped into a workable approach by Mr. Mike Sigal of Simpson, Thatcher
& Bartlett. His "Plan Mediation Proposal for Large Chapter 11 Cases" had the
support of Judge Jones and would have been, in my opinion, an important and
103. Jones/Zywicki Memorandum at 5. The same view was again expressed in a slightly different way. "In
fact, requiring disinterestedness is probably even more important when the estate is being administered by a
debtor in possession because arguably the debtor in possession and a creditor's committee may lack the same
incentive and ability to monitor the performance of counsel that a trustee has." Id.
104. In re Bonneville Pacific Corp., 196 B.R. 868 (Bankr. D. Utah 1996).
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useful modification of Chapter I L"o0 I believe it would have eliminated some of
the tension resulting from the courts imposing conflicting duties on the debtor in
possession and counsel for the debtor in possession.
A cornerstone of the Jones/Zywicki argument for retention of the disinterestedness standard is the mistaken premise that the disinterestedness standard ensures
consistency between the ethical rules of the Bankruptcy Code and the state ethical rules.
105. Mike Sigal, "Plan Mediation Proposal for Large Chapter 11 Cases," memorandum to National
Bankruptcy Review Commission for May 14, 1997, Washington, D.C. meeting (on file with author).
The proposal that I would like to suggest for the Commission's consideration, which I think promotes the social benefits of
preserving jobs
*
*
maintaining going concern values
in appropriate cases, without the negatives of
taking too long
*
costing too much
adverse impacts on the capital and credit markets,
is this:
A.
The debtor in possession would have a defined period--e.g., 6 months--to file a plan of
reorganization.
B.
After that time, any creditor (or other party in interest) could file a reorganization plan.
C.
If a reorganization plan were not confirmed within a defined period--e.g., I year--the Court
would appoint a Plan Mediator.
D.
The Plan Mediator would not be a trustee. The debtor in possession would stay in place
and continue to run the business.
E.
The Plan Mediator would be a neutral. He/she would have no economic interest in the outcome. Sources of Plan Mediators include: restructuring professionals; retired judges and attorneys;
law professors; practicing attorneys.
The Plan Mediator's sole focus would be a reorganization plan.
E
G.
The Plan Mediator would first try to achieve a consensual reorganization. This would build
on the financial/business analysis and negotiations that had already taken place, but which had so
far not been successful. In accordance with well-established mediation procedures, parties would be
required to talk to the Plan Mediator and the Plan Mediator would be prohibitedfrom disclosing any
matter of substance to the Court.
H.
The goal would be to achieve a consensual reorganization. But, in order to prevent parties
from stonewalling the mediation process, the Plan Mediator would have the power, if necessary, to
ultimately propose a reorganization plan or to report to the Court that a reorganization plan is not
feasible.
Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
The Plan Mediation Proposal has the following attributes:
*
defined period of exclusivity for the debtor in possession, e.g., 6 months
then opportunity for creditors, who (due to the fact that the capital structure of most businesses is leveraged with debt) usually have more invested in an enterprise than equity, to propose
reorganization plan
*
no litigation over exclusivity termination
*
defined time--e.g., full year--for parties to come to resolution themselves
*
once Plan Mediator appointed, flexibility of a financial/business restructuring among private parties with the aid of a neutral mediator, while at the same time having the aura of a federal
court in the background.
Id. at 4. See also Gerald K. Smith, Reorganizations, 1995-96 ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 605, 62829 (quoting Clark Boardman Callaghan).
Fairness needs to be achieved. Whatever the standards are, they should not be compromised.
Fairness is compromised by a litigation system. That is the goal of litigation, to achieve a reasonable accommodation by way of settlement or, if settlement is impossible, to dictate a conclusion to
the dispute. But Congressional standards of fairness should not be compromised. The use of an
independent trustee to formulate the plan will more nearly assure fairness.
Id. at 637.
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Under governing ethical codes, a lawyer is forbidden from representing one
client and asserting or defending a claim against another client--even if the
simultaneous representation is in connection with unrelated matters--unless consent is given by all affected parties.
But if the Proposal is enacted, federal law would establish a lower ethical standard than those prevailing under state regulations governing ethical conduct.
Thus, unless the Commission also wants to recommend preemption of state ethical rules to the contrary, a bankruptcy attorney could be put in the awkward and
uncomfortable position with having complied with federal law, but being in
dereliction of his duties under state ethical rules. Absent a compelling reason to
the contrary, such an incongruous result should be avoided."'
Since the disinterested standard does not address whether a lawyer can represent
"one client in asserting or defending a claim against another client" and concerns
the interests of a person, not the person's representation, with the exception of
the representation of an investment banker for the debtor under § 101(14)(C), it
is difficult to understand how this cornerstone is laid. Furthermore, the state
conflict rules come into play regardless of whether there is a disinterestedness
standard applicable to counsel for the debtor in possession. Eliminating disinterestedness would only do away with per se disqualification for immaterial reasons. Even more puzzling is the position asserted in the Memorandum that the
Working Group's proposal would abandon the state rule precluding simultaneous
representation in bilateral litigation. The Working Group's proposal did not override state rules, and if a lawyer could not represent a debtor or trustee because of
a conflict under state rules, that also would be the case under the proposal of the
Working Group.
The Memorandum also asserts that the Working Group's proposal "could permit debtor's counsel to represent a creditor in the same case." ' 7 But that is
expressly permitted under the Code since § 327(c) authorizes simultaneous representation of a creditor and the trustee, absent an actual conflict of interest. The
Working Group did not address this matter. Under § 1103(b), the Bankruptcy
Code also authorizes the simultaneous representation in the same case of a creditor and the committee. The Working Group did not address this matter either.
The assertion that the Working Group's proposal would place a bankruptcy attorney in the awkward and uncomfortable position of having complied with federal
law, but being in dereliction of his duties under state ethical rules, is incorrect;
that is the situation today,"' and it would not have been affected by the Working
Group's proposal.
The need to comply with state ethical rules is a separate matter--what I have
referred to elsewhere as "the other side of the coin."'" 9 There are differing state
106. Jones/Zywicki Memorandum at 5.
107. Id. at 7.
108. E.g., In re Dennis M. Breen, 830 P.2d 462 (Ariz. 1992). See discussion in Smith, supra note 20, at 803-

04.
109. Smith, Conflicts, supra note 20, at 807.
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rules and a variety of local bankruptcy rules addressing the applicable standard
of professional conduct. The situation is complex. Both district court and bankruptcy court local rules must be reviewed. Professor Coquillette summarized the
district court situation as follows:
Slightly more than half of forty-eight of these districts "have adopted local rules
and incorporate[d] state standards in states that, in turn, have adopted some version of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983)." Twelve districts
or approximately thirteen percent had rules incorporating state standards from
states which had some version of the 1969 ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Eastern and Southern Districts of California adopted the
California Rules of Professional Conduct. Ten districts adopted rules referring
to an ABA Model, four of which referred to the ABA Code, three to the Model
Rules and one to both. The Districts of Montana and the Southern District of
Georgia even referred to both an ABA Model and to state standards. Eleven districts have no local rules governing attorney conduct, but a number of these districts have standing orders. One district followed neither state standards nor an
ABA Model, but incorporated its own substantially modified version of the
ABA Model Rules."'

Ms. Patricia Channon of the Administrative Office summarized the situation for
the bankruptcy courts:
Bankruptcy courts in thirty-five districts have no rule at all. Bankruptcy courts
for twenty-seven districts have adopted the district court rule, but provide no
text of the adopted rule. Bankruptcy courts for six districts specify the rules
adopted by the highest court of the state in which the district is located. Two
courts impose standards which vary from those of the states in which the dis-

tricts are located, although one of these districts has also adopted the state standard. Of the districts that have a rule, one district requires that attorneys read
and become familiar with the state bar's Rules of Professional Conduct, while
another district encourages counsel to be familiar with the discovery guidelines
of the state bar.1"
There is a very real problem with the application of state ethical rules to bankruptcy cases. The bilateral litigation rule does not work with respect to the bankruptcy case as a whole. If it is applied to the bankruptcy case as a whole, the
result is that, absent consent of the other client, a lawyer is disqualified from representing a trustee or debtor in possession if the nonconsenting client is a creditor, equity security holder, or other party in interest, such as a party to an executory contract. This is an issue which requires careful attention. It needs to be
carefully thought through by knowledgeable persons in order to arrive at the
proper rule. If the bilateral litigation rule does apply to the entire case, as sug110. Id. at 828 (footnotes omitted).
111. Id. at 827 (footnotes omitted).
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gested by some, including Professor Zywicki, we will have closed the door
opened by the Bankruptcy Code to the representation of trustees and debtors in
possession by larger firms. As happened once before, law firms of any size will
abandon the representation of trustees and debtors in possession. Only firms
specializing in the representation of trustees will be able to represent trustees,
and only firms specializing in the representation of debtors will be able to represent debtors in possession. I asked that the American Bar Association create a
task force to consider conflicts in the bankruptcy context." 2 Although I had no
response, I understand that the ABA's Task Force 2000 will address difficult ethical issues. Surely this issue qualifies!
C. Judge Jones' "'Commission"Report

In her discussion, Judge Jones makes it clear that in her view, professionals are
fiduciaries for creditors and other parties in interest. This is inconsistent with
state ethical rules. I have touched on this elsewhere and will only point out here
that perhaps Judge Jones is attempting to fill the vacuum left by the abandonment of the independent trustee.
Judge Jones states that it is the creditors' money that is involved and that the
debtor is buying its continued existence with someone else's money, as creditors
are forced to forego payment so that the debtor can spend money in hopes of
reorganizing. That is often, but not always, so. Perhaps because Judge Jones
only represented creditors while practicing law at Andrews and Kurth, she
appears to have developed a one-sided view of reorganizations. This was not the
view of Chairman Douglas. In a discussion of the concept of the independent
trustee, Mr. Douglas made it clear that the independent trustee was the key to
reform, the thrust of the reform was to prevent domination of reorganizations by
secured creditors and insiders to the detriment of holders of publicly held securities.
All that the bill does, in my judgment, is to say that the old management shall
not be vested (and I may say parenthetically that in too many cases this was
done just as a matter of course) automatically, with fiduciary powers and duties
which it is unqualified to fulfill. If the members of the old management do not
find sufficiently attractive the opportunity to serve their real principals, the
creditors and stockholders, at a fair salary fixed by the court, unless the additional opportunities are afforded, covering up possible causes of action against
themselves, of controlling the reorganization process, of insuring their retention
by the reorganized company (and these are the only opportunities of which the
old management are deprived by the requirement of an independent trustee) I,
for one, do not think that they should be allowed to act in a fiduciary capacity." 3
112. Letter from Gerald K. Smith to Jerome J. Shestack, Esq. (June 4, 1997) (on file with author).
113. Testimony of William 0. Douglas at 177, Hearings on H.R. 6439, the successor bill to the National
Bankruptcy Conference's bill, H.R. 12889; H.R. 6439 was thereafter amended and reintroduced as H.R. 8046.
I partially addressed this elsewhere. Smith, supra note 20, at 823-26.
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Judge Jones apparently assumes, as does Professor Zywicki, that the disinterestedness standard precludes a professional from representing a trustee or a
debtor in possession if the professional represents a party in interest in the bankruptcy case in unrelated matters. Former Chapter X Rule 10-202(c)(2) was to
the contrary. It provided that "[r]epresentation of a creditor or stockholder of the
debtor in a matter other than one which may become involved in the Chapter X
case need not be deemed of itself to affect the disinterestedness of an attorney."
However, the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 10-206 qualified this provision:
If other competent attorneys are available, the trustee's attorney should be selected from that group. This exception should be utilized only in the case where
there is a real need. And even if such an attorney is considered, it remains important to determine14whether he is disqualified on any other ground for having an
adverse interest.

This came close to the Jones/Zywicki position, but the current rule in § 327(c) of
the Code is to the contrary:
In a case under chapter 7, 11 or 12 of this title, a person is not disqualified for
employment under this section solely because of such person's employment by
or representation of a creditor, unless there is an objection by another creditor or
the United States [T]rustee, in which case the court shall disapprove such
employment if there is an actual conflict of interest.11
Judge Jones is also incorrect when she states that the proposal of the Working
Group initially adopted by the Commission "would have established a lower ethical standard than those prevailing under state regulations of the practice of
'
law."116
As mentioned above, no proposal of the Working Group replaced state
ethical rules. The proposal of the Working Group utilized the Restatement language to define adverse interest for the purpose of guiding practitioners and
courts as to its meaning, but there was not even a hint of an intention to displace
or preempt state rules.
The Bankruptcy Code should define conflict of interest for purposes of retention of professionals under section 327. A professional has a conflict of interest
if there is a substantial risk that such professional's representation will be materially and adversely affected by the professional's own interests or by the professional's duties to another person that currently employs or formerly employed
such professional, or a third person. The proposal does not affect a professional's duty under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014 to disclose "all connections with the
debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and
114. Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 10-206, Part 2, COLLIER PAMPHLET EDrION, 516 (1979).
115. 11 U.S.C. § 327(c) (1993 & Supp. 1997).
116. Review Commission Report at 876; see also Jones/Zywicki Memorandum at 5.
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trustee, or any person employed in the office of
accountants, the United States
' 17
the United States trustee."
Judge Jones correctly observed that this proposal meant that immaterial conflicts
would not be disqualifying. She found this troublesome, which is surprising
since she recommended, and the Commission agreed, that a de minimus claim or
interest, which surely includes an immaterial claim or interest, would not be disqualifying.
Judge Jones is also mistaken in her discussion of §§ 201 and 209 of the
Restatement as follows:
Under the ALI's Restatement of the Law Third, The Law Governing Lawyers
(the "Restatement"), it is not completely clear whether bankruptcy lawyers must
comply with § 209, which deals with the ethical obligations associated with representing parties with conflicting interests in civil litigation, or § 201, which
applies to conflicts of interest in transactional matters. The most recent proposed amendments to the Restatement opted to take "no position on the applicability" of § 209(2) in bankruptcy, thereby leaving the question unanswered.
Other indicia of intent, however, suggest that ethical issues in bankruptcy should
continue to be governed by § 209. For instance, all discussion of bankruptcy
matters is found in the comments to § 209. Moreover, comment b to § 201
specifically assumes that § 209 applies, rather than § 201, in "situations, not
involving litigation, in which significant impairment of a client's expectations of
the lawyer's loyalty would be similarly likely." Thus, even if the text of the
Restatement does not mandate treating bankruptcy proceedings as litigation
matters, the commentary strongly indicates that this should be the case.118
I have chronicled the drafting history of Chapter 8 of the ALI's Restatement and
will not repeat it here. 1 '9 The revised comment c(ii) makes clear that the
American Law Institute did not take a position on the issue.
c(ii). Opposing clients in multi-party litigation. Certain types of civil proceedings, such as bankruptcy cases, may involve multiple parties and disputes.
There is substantial disagreement whether various bankruptcy proceedings
should be considered under Subsection (2). Tribunals must resolve such questions in light of a body of decisions developed in the specific context of bankruptcy, and often the issues are controlled by statute. The context involves
transformation of a business relationship into one that is at least in part controlled by different principles and rules, some of them of a fiduciary nature.
The Restatement takes no position on the applicability of Subsection (2) in the
many situations that may arise in bankruptcy. However, "asserting or defending
a claim" within the meaning of the Subsection refers to a dispute about the
117.
Review
118.
119.

Draft Memorandum from Prof. Lawrence P. King and Elizabeth I. Holland to the National Bankruptcy
Commission, Prof. Elizabeth Warren and Stephen H. Case, 3 (May 1, 1997) (on file with author).
Review Commission Report at 877-78 (footnotes omitted).
Smith, supra note 20, at 881-98.
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or filing a claim as to which there is no reasonable
claim and not merely holding
20
likelihood of dispute.
Professor Charles Wolfram, the Reporter for the Restatement, as recently as
November 13, 1997, concurred.
[T]he current version of Section 209 takes absolutely no position on how the
Restatement might apply to the situation of bankruptcy. Thus, fears that have
been expressed that courts will cite one or the other Section for one or another
assume an absence of plain-English reading ability
of possible positions must
121
on the part of the courts.
Professor Wolfram's letter responded to a request of Mr. William Knight
Zewadski of the Florida Bar that various interested parties contact officers of the
ALl, as well as Professor Wolfram, to support an effort by the ALl to address
bankruptcy conflicts in The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers.
Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., the Director of the ALl, also responded to Mr.
Zewadski. Since this has been a troubling point, and one thoughtfully addressed
by the ALl, Professor Hazard's humorous response indicates some impatience:
If the Restatement addressed the conflict problem in bankruptcy in terms of the
rules governing conflicts as set forth in the Restatement--rules universally
accepted in this country--the statement would, in my opinion, provide that a
firm handling a bankruptcy for a debtor, whether Chapter 7 or Chapter 11,
would require consent of any concurrent client represented by the same firm
who was a creditor whose claim stood in any substantial degree of risk of being
compromised in the course of the proceeding, and of any former client having a
claim subject to that risk which had arisen from a transaction in which the client
has been represented by the firm. In my opinion, this rule may well be too onerous, and bankruptcy law should recognize the efficacy of an "insulation wall"
within a firm between lawyers for the debtor and lawyers for creditors not likely
to suffer substantial financial harm if their claims are compromised. However,
such a rule cannot be fashioned out of the generalized recognized rules on conflict of interest. We thought it prudent, and certainly to the interest of the bankruptcy bar, not to prejudice or foreclose a development in "bankruptcy conflicts" by speaking specifically to the issue in the Restatement. If strongly
Reporters could reconsider and tender a formulation like
pressed, however, the
22
that stated above.1
Although not addressed or decided by the Commission, Judge Jones used the
opportunity given to write the commentary for the Commission to state her view,
120. Council Draft No. 13, Comment c(ii) to § 209; Smith, supra note 20, at 897.
121. Letter from Prof. Charles W. Wolfram to Eli H. Subin, Esq. (Nov. 13, 1997) (on file with author).
122. Letter from Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. to William Knight Zewadski, Esq. (Nov. 25, 1997) (on file with
author).
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and that of Professor Zywicki, that no professional can represent a trustee or
debtor in possession if they represent parties in interest in the bankruptcy case in
unrelated matters. Since she asserts a disqualification under the disinterested
standard, waiver by the client in the unrelated matter would not solve the problem. This would, of course, promote inconsistency with state ethical rules, a
result criticized by Judge Jones when attempting to discredit the recommendation that the disinterested standard not apply to counsel for the debtor in possession.
Perhaps Judge Jones is influenced by the rules regulating federal judges. A
brief review of the Disqualification Act is instructive.123 The Act provides for
disqualification for the appearance of impartiality124 or a financial interest in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding.12 The first ground,
the appearance of impropriety, is close to what Judge Jones states as the rule in
bankruptcy cases, even though deleted from the definition of disinterestedness in
1978 and abandoned by the Model Rules in the 1980s. Mr. John P. Frank has
observed that the statutory phrase,
"impartiality might reasonably be questioned,""12 [is] commonly caught up in
the phrase which has a long history, pre-§ 455 A.B.A. and U.S. Supreme Court
opinions. The amorphous quality of the phrase makes it hard to deal with decisively. However, the phrase has gained technical meaning in both the legislative
history and the cases. Categorically it does not mean that pointing a finger and
expressing dismay is enough ....

."'

[T]he basis of disqualification
... [is] to
'1 28

be determined by "what the traditions and practice have been."

However, the phrase does not authorize disqualification for "remote, contingent,
or speculative interest," or "indirect and attenuated interests ... 129
The financial interest ground is stringent. Financial interest is defined to
include "ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relation13
ship as director,advisor, or other31active participantin the affairs of a party,""
1
and the Act precludes any waiver.

The disqualification rules are stringent, and necessarily so. They concern the
person who decides matters affecting parties to a controversy. That is a different
role than that of a professional representing one of the parties. The disqualifying
rule as to representation of a party is not as stringent; it is, assuming the draftsmen of the Restatement have it right, whether there is a substantial risk that the
123. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1993 & Supp. 1997).
124. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1993 & Supp. 1997).
125. 28 U.S.C. § 455(4) (1993 & Supp. 1997).
126. Memorandum of John P. Frank, submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee in connection with the
confirmation of Judge Steven G. Breyer (July 12, 1994) (on file with author).

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Senate Hearing 1973, at 15.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 455(c)(4) (1993 & Supp. 1997).
131. 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (1993 & Supp. 1997). However, there is an escape valve if substantial judicial time
has been devoted to a matter before the discovery of the financial interest if the judge, spouse, or minor child,
as the case may be, divests himself of the interest that provides the ground for disqualification.
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interest will materially and adversely affect the representation.'32 However, the
Bankruptcy Act employed a different standard regarding the Chapter X trustee,
whose role is closer to that of a judge than the protagonist for one of the parties.
The disinterestedness standard is similar to the judicial disqualification rules.
The independent trustee cannot have a financial interest in the debtor. The independent trustee has to be free of bias since he represents the interests of all parties. It seems only logical--and noncontroversial--that the trustee should be represented by a disinterested lawyer. However, there is little historical information
available as to why it was necessary to extend the disinterestedness requirement
to trustees' counsel, other than that was what Commissioner Douglas and the
SEC desired.133
The views expressed by Judge Jones in the Jones/Zywicki Memorandum and
in her Commission Report should have been anticipated. They were expressed in
rudimentary form a decade ago in In Re Consolidated Bancshares, Inc." 4 In
Consolidated,an objection was made to the fee request of special counsel who
handled major litigation on behalf of the debtor in possession. The basis for the
objection was that such counsel had a conflict of interest in that he also represented a director in related litigation. In her opinion for the Fifth Circuit, Judge
Jones stated that the facts were not adequately developed by the trial court, which
had concluded that "the facts concerning Mr. Bryant's representation of former
officers and directors of the debtor were fully developed.., and were not of such
a nature as to deny payment to him of any fees." ' Without any discussion of the
facts other than representation of the debtor and a director in apparently related
litigation, Judge Jones went on to comment concerning disinterestedness and
interests adverse to the estate. Her views in Consolidated are reiterated in the
Jones/Zywicki Memorandum and Judge Jones' comments in the Commission
Report. The following excerpt from Collieris relied on in all three:
[T]he requirement of disinterestedness appears broad enough to include anyone
who in the slightest degree might have some interest or relationship that would
color the independent and impartial attitude required by the Code ...indirect or
remote associations or affiliations, as well as direct, may engender conflicting
loyalties. The purpose of the rule is to prevent even the emergence of a conflict
irrespective of the integrity of the person under consideration .... 13"
132. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 201 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996). In
addition, the bilateral litigation rule prevents, absent consent, a lawyer from suing an existing client. Id. §
209(b).
133. Commencing June 1, 1937, the Conmittee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Manuel Celler
presiding, held hearings on H.R. 6439, the successor bill to the National Bankruptcy Conference's bill, H.R.
12889. H.R. 6439 was subsequently amended and reintroduced as H.R. 8046. One reviewing the transcripts of
the hearings, including the letter of May 25, 1937 from James M. Landes, then Chairman of the SEC, and the
statement of then Commissioner William 0. Douglas, is struck by the lack of any discussion of the disinterestedness requirement imposed on counsel for the independent trustee. The reason is simple. No one argued with
or questioned the proposition that a disinterested fiduciary should be represented by disinterested counsel.
134. Matter of Consolidated Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1986).
135. Id. at 1256 (citations omitted).
136. Id.
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Judge Jones' views may be taking root. The recent decision of District Judge
McKelvie in Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc.137 is an example. The decision is
succinctly described by former Circuit Judge John J. Gibbons in his brief in support of his appeal of the decision.
This is an appeal of a district court order that in effect forces a chapter 11
trustee--John J. Gibbons--to withdraw from a major bankruptcy reorganization
proceeding on the basis of a manifestly erroneous holding that his law firm's
prior representation of a creditor on a small and completely unrelated matter
"taints the image of objectivity that the trustee and his counsel should possess."
The accusation at the heart of the district court's disqualification order--that
both the trustee and his lawyers are not "disinterested"--is not just flatly wrong,
it is dangerous."

In Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc., the reference was withdrawn from
Bankruptcy Judge Balick by Judge McKelvie who then granted a motion to
appoint an independent trustee. The U.S. Trustee selected Judge John J.
Gibbons, the widely respected former chief judge of the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals. Judge Gibbons elected to employ his own law firm as counsel. The
indenture trustee of bonds issued by the parent holding companies and some of
the bondholders and stockholders objected. The U.S. Trustee did not oppose the
engagement, but Judge McKelvie refused to authorize the employment of Judge
Gibbons' firm. The firm was eminently qualified, and a trustee may employ his
own firm under the existing law. Judge McKelvie criticized the practice, but disqualified the firm, not because it was the trustee's firm, but because the firm
presently represented one of the protagonists in the Chapter 11 cases, Chase
Manhattan Bank, on an unrelated matter and had represented Chase from time to
time on unrelated matters. Because of the representational relationship, Judge
McKelvie held that the law firm was not disinterested. Although Judge
McKelvie was aware that this caused a concern as to Judge Gibbons' disinterestedness, Judge McKelvie did not disqualify Judge Gibbons.
The decision of Judge McKelvie is the Jones/Zywicki position carried to its
logical conclusion. Like Judge Jones and Professor Zywicki, Judge McKelvie
relies on catchy phrases and mixes apples and oranges. By way of example,
Judge McKelvie relies on cases "noting" that a trustee must be "divested of any
scintilla of personal interest,' 39 and that adverse interest must be given a "liberal
construction."" ' An example of mixing apples and oranges is the treatment of
representation in an unrelated matter as though it were simultaneous representation in the same bankruptcy case. For example, Judge McKelvie relies on a
137.
1998).
138.
139.
140.

In re Marvel Entertainment, Inc., No. 97-638, 1998 WL 181084, 32 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 102 (D. Del.
Brief for Appellant, In re Marvel Entertainment, Inc., 140 E3d 463 (3rd Cir. 1998).
In re Marvel Entertainment, Inc., supra note 137, at 4.
Id.
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quote from Chief Justice Taft's 1929 decision in Weil v. Neary that "many abuses
have occurred in the bankruptcy practice and none is more frequent than that by
which the attorney for petitioning creditors becomes counsel for the trustee subsequently appointed."1 1' As does Professor Zywicki in his article, Judge
McKelvie confuses the corruption in the Southern District of New York in the
late 1920s with historical problems in equity receivership reorganizations which
led to reforms in the 1930s, including the Chapter X disinterestedness standard.
Judge McKelvie mentioned the self-serving statement of counsel for one of the
parties in interest who opposed the appointment, to the effect that she would just
not feel warm and fuzzy if the trustee and his counsel eventually decided not to
sue Chase. This is the "factual" underpinning of Judge McKelvie's statements
concerning an "appearance of conflict" '42 which would undermine public confidence in the judiciary. The vapid phrase, "appearance of impropriety," is discussed, but ostensibly not relied on by Judge McKelvie 43 Fortunately, Judge
Gibbons appealed, and the Third Circuit reversed on March 26, 1998. The Third
Circuit rejected the notion that an "appearance of conflict" was disqualifying.
The Third Circuit required a materially adverse interest resulting from one of the
specific reasons set forth in § 101(14) or for any other reason. In addition, the
Third Circuit held that § 327(a) requires disqualification if there is an actual conflict, but the trial court has discretion to approve employment where there is a
potential conflict. Thus, the decision of the Third Circuit strongly supports the
44
abandonment of the disinterested standard across the board.
The McKelvie decision was rendered on Tuesday, January 27, 1998. In a
remarkable example of bureaucratic speed, the U.S. Trustee sought to implement
the "taint" ruling on Thursday, January 29, and the next Monday, February 2.
In three different chapter 11 cases commenced in the Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Delaware, the Office of the United States Trustee took the position
that the McKelvie decision, while not binding on other judges in the district
court and the bankruptcy court, did establish a new policy for professional
engagements, which it recommended should be followed by other judges.
Based upon the adoption of that policy, the Office of the United States Trustee
objected in each case to the engagement of the proposed professionals for the
respective debtors in possession. In two of the cases, Bankruptcy Judge Peter
Walsh rejected the recommendations of the Office of the United States Trustee
and dissected the McKelvie decision, found it distinguishable and limited to the
facts and circumstances of the Marvel Entertainment chapter 11 cases. In the
other case pending before United States District Court Judge Sue L. Robinson,
In re PWS Holding Corporation,Bruno "s,Inc., et al., the Court likewise rejected
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 5 (quoting Weil v. Neary, 278 U.S. 160, 168 (1929)).
In re Marvel Entertainment, Inc., supra note 137, at 15.
Id. at 13-14.
In re Marvel Entertainment, Inc., supra note 138.
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the recommendations of the office of the United States Trustee and concluded
that the Marvel Entertainment opinion and decision are inapplicable to other
cases. 145
The pro se brief of Judge Gibbons makes it clear that the disqualification was
"based solely on the law firm's prior representation of Chase on the Arts Center
matter." 14 Judge Gibbons went on to describe the adverse impact of the "taint"
standard.
It is difficult to overstate, furthermore, the sweeping effect the district court's
order will have if left in place. Reduced to its barest essentials, the district
court's new subjective "taint" standard means that a trustee or his attorney may
not serve in a bankruptcy if anyone at the law firm ever represented a single
interested party on a single matter, no matter how unrelated it was to the issues
in the bankruptcy. This crabbed test is incompatible with the policies that the
Bankruptcy Code embodies; in particular the need to ensure that trustees are
equipped with the means necessary to fulfill their fiduciary duties to the estate,
and to bring about a fair and efficient resolution to the bankruptcy. As the court
held in In re Codesco, 18 B.R. 997, 999 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982), "the trustee
should have wide latitude in determining who shall be employed to perform
legal services for the estate [and] 'only in the rarest cases should the trustee be
deprived of.. . selecting his own counsel'." (citing In re Mandell, 69 E2d 830,
831 (2d Cir. 1934)). See also In re Caldor,Inc., 193 B.R. 165, 170 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996).
No more vivid example exists of the need to empower the trustee with the
lawyer of his choice than this one. As the U.S. Trustee stated at the hearing on
the trustee's application, a trustee in cases such as this requires the assistance of
a law firm with considerable breadth and depth of experience in a variety of disciplines. (A 65-67). In addition to expertise and depth in the areas of bankrupt145. Letter from Harvey R. Miller to Gerald K. Smith (Feb. 9, 1998) (on file with author).
146. Brief for Appellant, supra note 138, at 31.
The District Court also expressed concern over the propriety of the Trustee's retention, as counsel,
of a firm in which he was a partner, but acknowledged that the issue was not before the court at that
time. (A41). Especially when, as here, multi-disciplinary legal action must be taken immediately, a
trustee's retention of his or her own firm is proper. See In re Butler Indus. Inc., 101 B.R. 194
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd., 114 B.R. 695 (Bankr. D. Cal. 1990).
Id. at 31, n. 7.
Notwithstanding the express provisions of §327(c), the court did not even purport to find that the
firm's prior and now-terminated representation of Chase on the Arts Center matter gave rise to an
actual or even potential conflict. The court implicitly conceded that no actual conflict existed, stating that compliance with the code of professional conduct would not necessarily mean that the firm
was "disinterested" (A 42-43) and that the existence of a conflict of interest was not a "key issue" in
the case. (A 44). Nor did the court even make a finding that an appearanceof a conflict of interest
existed, in the usual sense of that term. The court hinted at one point that the "appearance of impropriety" standard applied, but it never actually found (because no basis existed to support such a finding) that such an "appearance" existed. (A 43-44). To the contrary, the court expressly disavowed
that standard when it noted that an "appearance of impropriety" was not a "key issue" either. (A
44). The district court's disavowal of the controlling standard is telling; it is simply not possible to
conclude that either the trustee or his firm are precluded under it.
Id. at 31.
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cy and litigation, the trustee needs proper and competent representation in the
areas of tax, corporate, securities, employment, international, and intellectual
property law. (A 392-398). Few bankruptcy cases present the breadth of legal
problems, especially in the area of intellectual property, that are presented in
this proceeding. Few firms, therefore, are equipped to handle the number and
variety of the issues it presents. But under the district court's holding, the firms
that are the best suited to represent the trustee in such a case are, perversely, the
least likely to get the job, since the larger the firm and the more general the
practice, the greater the chance that the firm did prior work for an interested
party on unrelated matters. This bankruptcy, for example, involves 1,700 creditors, including a large number of banks and other lending institutions. (A 384).
It is remarkable, in fact, that Gibbons, Del Deo had so few past or present matters with any of them. Aside from needlessly burdening the trustee's ability to
find competent counsel, perhaps the greater evil here is that the district court's
order will place too much power in the hands of creditors and other interested
parties. Trustees are appointed precisely when creditors and shareholders are
unable to agree among themselves and with the debtor on a plan for emerging
from bankruptcy. In the superheated atmosphere of a contentious bankruptcy,
the last thing the courts should do is give each interested party what amounts to
a veto power over the trustee, by enabling them to disqualify the trustee or prevent the trustee from hiring his or her lawyer of choice merely by claiming to be
"uncomfortable" with the firm's unrelated business. That is precisely what this
court was rightly concerned about in BH&P. Giving creditors the virtually
unchecked power to trip up the trustee in this way conflicts with the very purpose that a trustee is meant to serve: to cut through the dissent, formulate a plan,
and make sure the business is being operated properly in the meantime.147
We are witnessing an interesting, judicially inspired metamorphosis. In the
late 1930s, Congress changed the reorganization process from the insider dominated equity receivership to a statutory regime controlled by an independent
trustee. However, the reforms of the 1930s were not effective since management-controlled Chapter XI became the dominant vehicle for reorganization. To
remedy this, in 1973, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws recommended a
combining of Chapters X and XI into a single reorganization vehicle which contemplated
that the appointment of an independent trustee be discretionary, but that the
need for such an appointment be presumptive where indebtedness exceeds one
million and there are three hundred or more security holders .... If an independent trustee is not appointed, the administrator or any party in interest may
request that the court appoint an independent person to investigate or formulate
14 8
a plan, even though existing management is not ousted.
147. Id. at 34-36.
148. Commission Report, supra note 24, Part I, at 253.
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Congress accepted the Commission's recommendation of a single reorganization practice, but opted for one dominated by management. For the last twenty
years, management-controlled reorganization has been the prevailing method.
But we are once again on the verge of significant change. Some courts are treating management like a trustee and are imposing on counsel for management a
policing role to insure compliance of management with its undefined fiduciary
duties. It is this new role that requires Judge Jones' idealized reorganization
lawyer, one without "the slightest degree" of interest or relationship "that would
color the independent and impartial attitude required." Professor Westbrook's
concerns will be realized; the pool of available talent to represent debtors in possession will be dramatically diminished."' For a slightly different reason, this
occurred in the wake of the Protective Committee Study and the Chandler Act
s
Amendments. Major law firms abandoned the reorganization practice." When
the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States looked at reorganizations in the 1970s, there were no Wall Street law firms involved in the practice.
Indeed, about the only member of a Wall Street law firm who had expertise in the
bankruptcy law was William C. Knox, Jr., of White & Case, who had been a
member of the National Bankruptcy Conference since 1951, but specialized in
corporate and securities law, not bankruptcy. Before we cause another exodus,
we need to give serious consideration to what we are doing. The application of
the disinterestedness standard, in the manner recommended by Judge Jones and
Professor Zywicki, or the application of Judge McKelvie's "taint" standard, will
result in the disqualification of nonspecialized firms. At a minimum, firms of
any size will be precluded from representing management in reorganization
cases.
D. U.S. I rustee Agrees With Judge Jones
Before criticizing the Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee, I want to make it
clear that I am a strong supporter both of its Director, Mr. Jerry Patchan, and of
the program itself. Having said that, I feel free to express my disappointment at
the lack of leadership by the Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee on matters concerning the employment of professionals. Its actions and inaction are reminis149. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Paying the Piper: Rethinking Professional Compensation in Bankruptcy, 1

AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 287 (1993). My former partner, Judge Charles G. Case II, concurs:
One issue in this mix that does not seem to get enough analysis is the built-in conflict that arises
because of the debtor in possession's lawyer's position as an administrative claimant. In all too
many cases, there is a real tension between payment of professional fees and payments to other creditors. This creates a conflict that is much more real than the more hypothetical conflicts that arise,
for example, because counsel's firm may hold a pre-petition unsecured claim. This problem is exacerbated by Section 1129(a)(9) in that it requires payment in full of approved administrative expenses
unless the holder of the claim agrees otherwise. This puts counsel in an obvious conflict over
whether, and to what extent, to modify his Section 1129(a)(9) rights so as to enhance the confirmability of a debtor's plan.
Letter from Judge Case to Gerald K. Smith (Dec. 15, 1997) (on file with author).
150. This probably was due to the stigma created by the Protective Committee Report and the fact that they
were disqualified from representing the trustee under the disinterested standard. It took ingenious counsel only
a few years to develop Chapter XI into a viable reorganization tool for large, publicly held corporations.
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cent of the entrenched bureaucracy that led to the termination of the SEC's role
in reorganizations."' 1
According to Mr. Patchan's letter of May 14, 1997, to the Commission, "[w]e
have reviewed the paper prepared by Judge Jones and Professor Zywicki and are
in agreement with both their analysis and recommendations."' 52 The position
taken by the U.S. Trustee was unsupported by empirical data. At the least, one
would have expected a survey of the regional offices to determine how matters
were handled in the field, as well as problems encountered. Instead, all we got
were generalities:
The present bright-line rule for disinterest generally ensures that a professional
does not hold a personal interest in the debtor. It serves an important function
by safeguarding both the system and its professionals from insinuations of
inside deals and personal financial motives.
It also reduces litigation by discouraging those who cannot meet the rule from
seeking employment.
The nature of the bright-line rule is that it applies across the board, subordinating the interests of individual situations to the broader interests of the whole. In
this instance, the rule requiring disinterest establishes a broad principle of
integrity that serves the community of interests involved in the bankruptcy
process. It should not be lightly discarded.
The present statute fosters uniformity and seeks to minimize the need for litigation. This is good for the case and good for the system.
We are not aware of any case in which a debtor was unable to obtain competent
representation because of the disinterestedness rules.
Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014(a) an employment applicant must state "all of the
person's connection with the debtor." These connections generally are read in
light of the specific requirements of disinterestedness. If the disinterestedness
requirement is eliminated, we are concerned that professionals might view their
disclosure obligations under the Rule to be less strict. It is critical that any proposal that is ultimately recommended by the Commission reaffirm the need for
full disclosure."5 3
A review of the U.S. Trustee's Handbook relevant to the important matter of
employment of professionals is discouraging. There is no guidance to U.S.
151. See generally Report of Commissioner Bevis Longstreth, The Securities and Exchange Commission's
Role in Bankruptcy Reorganization Proceedings (Nov. 1983) (on file with author).
152. Letter from Jerry Patchan, Director, U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office of the United States
Trustees, to Brady C. Williamson, Chairman, National Bankruptcy Review Commission (May 14, 1997) (on
file with author).
153. Id.
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Trustees or professionals. The split in the courts over actual and potential conflicts is noted, but not resolved."" The abandoned concept of an appearance of
impropriety is set forth as a basis of disqualification.5 5
The result of the lack of guidance by the Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee
and its blind application of the disinterestedness standard has caused unnecessary
expense and disruption of cases. A good example is found in the 1997 decision
of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit in In re S.S. Retail Stores
Corp.15 In that case, a partner of counsel for the debtor had been an assistant
secretary for two years prior to the filing of the case, but had resigned shortly
before the filing of the Chapter 11 case. The U.S. Trustee objected on the basis
that the firm did not meet the disinterestedness standard. In response, a supplemental memorandum was filed, establishing that the partner had no decisionmaking power, no ability to manage or direct activities, no involvement in the
day-to-day operation of the business, and no financial interest. The bankruptcy
court approved the employment, concluding that the partner was not an officer.
Again, the U.S. Trustee objected. The bankruptcy court again approved the
employment, this time recognizing that the partner was an officer under
California law, but concluding that the disqualification of the partner was not
attributed to the firm. Unchastened, the U.S. Trustee appealed! The Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel affirmed, holding that disqualification under the disinterestedness standard is not attributable to the firm under the Bankruptcy Code. The
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel distinguished Value Property Trust v. Zim Co. (In re
Mortgage & Realty Trust),"s7 which involved disqualification of a law firm from
representing a creditor in the bankruptcy case because a partner had been a member of the debtor's board of directors. Since this was a disqualification under the
state rules of professional conduct (although the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
154. Some courts require an actual conflict of interest to render counsel not disinterested. See In re
Stamford Color Photo, Inc., 98 B.R. 135, 137-38 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989); H & H Developers, Inc. v.
Waterfall Village of Atlanta, Ltd. (In re Waterfall Village of Atlanta, Ltd.), 103 B.R. 340, 344
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989). Other courts find a potential conflict is disabling. See Matter of Codesco,
Inc., 18 B.R. 997, 999 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In the Matter of Proof of the Pudding, Inc., 3 B.R.
645, 647 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); see also Shaw & Levine and Bohack Corp. v. Gulf & Western
Indus., Inc., (In re The Bohack Corp.), 607 E2d 258, 263 (2nd Cir. 1979). Some courts fimd that
there is no distinction between a potential or an actual conflict. See, e.g., In re Adam Furniture
Indus., Inc., 158 B.R. 291, 301 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1993); see generally Christopher M. Ashby,
Comment, Bankruptcy Code Section 32 7(a) and Potential Conflicts of Interests -Always or Never
Disabling?,29 Hous. L. REV. 433 (1992). Generally, a finding of actual conflict warrants disqualification of a professional under section 327(a). See, e.g., In re Roberts, Inc., 46 B.R. 815, 847
(Bankr. D. Utah 1985), aff'd in part, 75 B.R. 402 (D. Utah 1987).
UNITED STATES TRUSTEE MANUAL, p. 74.

155. In addition, under the appropriate circumstance, the appearance of impropriety or an appearance
of potential conflict can be grounds for disqualification of counsel. See, e.g., In re Milton Braten,
73 B.R. 896, 899 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing Sapienza v. New York News, Inc., 481 E Supp. 676
(S.D.N.Y. 1979)); In re Matter of Proof of the Pudding, Inc., 3 B.R. 645, 648 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1980)).
Id.
156. United States Trustee v. S.S. Retail Stores Corp. (In re S.S. Retail Store Corp.), 211 B.R. 699 (BAP 9th
Cir. 1997).
157. Value Property Trust v. ZimCo. (In re Mortgage & Realty Trust), 195 B.R. 740 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996).
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mistakenly referred to it as disqualification under § 327), it was appropriate to
disqualify the firm as well.
The U.S. Trustee has appealed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's ruling to the
Ninth Circuit."s8 The U.S. Trustee's Brief states that "although a 'disinterested'
trustee is no longer a mandatory safeguard required in each case for checking
insider manipulation, the necessary checking function is now served by requiring
that the 'professional persons' by and through whom the debtor-in-possession
participates in the bankruptcy case are 'disinterested."' 15 9 From another comment in the brief, not only is the U.S. Trustee dissatisfied with the Congressional
decision to abandon independent trustees, it is also displeased with the deletion
of "counsel for the debtor" from the list of those who are interested.' °
Although the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel cited In re Creative Restaurant
Management,'' a 1992 decision, it could also have cited more recent cases to the
same effect.162 The courts are simply refusing to impute disqualification under
the disinterestedness standard to the firm. Regardless of what one thinks about
that approach, it is clear that courts dislike the disinterestedness standard for
counsel for the debtor in possession and are confining its mischief.
The position of the U.S. Trustee for the Western District of Missouri is more
flexible. Apparently, the local practice in the Western District of Missouri is that
"the U.S. Trustee will withdraw its objection to retention of counsel if such counsel--and its client--instead agree that counsel will serve as special counsel to
carry out the duties as to which it has developed specialized knowledge." ' 3
V CONCLUSION

Despite the Jones/Zywicki Memorandum, Professor Zywicki's article, and the
limited recommendation of the Review Commission, problems remain. It is time
that these problems were addressed. Likely candidates to do so are the National
Bankruptcy Conference and the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules. The
task is complicated by the significant change in the system of reorganization as
to major cases effected in 1978. Control has shifted from an independent trustee
to management. Although the Supreme Court of the United States has stated that
the debtor in possession is a fiduciary,6 4 there is uncertainty as to what this
158. United States Trustee v. S.S. Retail Stores Corp., No. 97-17004 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997).
159. Id., Brief for the Appellant, at 25.
160. The transcript of the bankruptcy court's hearing regarding the disqualification of Gibson, Dunn
shows that the bankruptcy judge fundamentally misconstrued the purpose of the "disinterested person" requirement. Whereas the requirement is intended to ensure that counsel to a debtor-in-possession is detached from the debtor's insiders, the bankruptcy judge reasoned that the requirement
should not apply to a firm when the firm's "interested" partner is "not the enemy" of the debtor corporation's insiders. See CR 156, at 65-67 ("we're not talking about any-Mr. Calof having represented any adverse interests to the Debtor; he's been on the Debtor's team all along, remains on the
Debtor's team * * * * he doesn't have any adverse information * * * he's not the enemy.").
Id. at 29.
161. In re Creative Restaurant Management, Inc., 139 B.R. 902, 913 (Bankr. WD. Mo. 1992).
162. Smith, supra note 20, at 815-19.
163. In re Creative Restaurant Management, Inc., supra note 161, at 902, 909.
164. Commodity Future Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. 1986, 85 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1985).
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means. The Bankruptcy Code gives only limited guidance in not imposing the
duty of investigation on the debtor in possession. Courts and commentators
attempt to treat the debtor in possession like the independent trustee as far as its
fiduciary role is concerned. But it is an awkward concept, the self-interested
fiduciary.
Under the rules of professional conduct adopted by most states, an attorney has
a number of duties to a client. One is to "proceed in a manner reasonably calculated to advance a client's lawful objectives, as defined by the client after consultation. 16 5 If the debtor in possession wishes to pursue a course of action that
would favor ownership at the expense of creditors, can--and must--an attorney
carry out that directive after advising the debtor in possession of its fiduciary
duties?166 Some courts167 and commentators" a suggest to the contrary, even
asserting that the attorney representing the debtor in possession has a fiduciary
16
duty to creditors. 1
Professor Jay Westbrook described the role of counsel for the debtor in possession as one of "inherent conflict."170 Professor Coquillette concurs, but too narrowly confines the virus to the Northern District of Texas.
[C]onflict of interest is inherent in the representation of a debtor in possession
(DIP) during a chapter 11 reorganization. Unless a trustee has been appointed
(not the usual situation), the DIP is the debtor itself. 11 U.S.C. § 1101. Section
1107 of the Bankruptcy Code imposes on the DIP most of the duties of a
trustee. Nowhere is there any reference to duties to the owner of the debtor. See
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Fees and Inherent Conflicts of Interest, 1 AM.

BANKR.

L. REV. 287, 290 (1993). Nor is the Bankruptcy Code clear on whether
any duty is owed to creditors. Id. Three cases from the Northern District of
Texas, however, provide that the DIP owes a duty of loyalty to creditors. See
INsT.

Diamond Lumber, Inc. v. Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of Diamond Lumber,
Inc., 88 B.R. 773 (N.D. Tex. 1988); In re Kendavis Indus. Int'l, Inc., 91 B.R. 742
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988); In re Chapel Gate Apartments, Ltd., 64 B.R. 569

(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986). This can create conflict of interest. While the DIP is
165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 28(1) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
See generally Smith, supra note 20, at 841-42.
166. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Obligations of Counsel for a Debtor in Bankruptcy, published in
Bankruptcy Ethics: The ALI Project-The Law Governing Bankruptcy Lawyers, Business Bankruptcy
Committee and Corporate Counsel Litigation Section, Chicago Annual Meeting (Feb. 5, 1995) pp. 2-5.
167. Examples of cases include In re United Utensils Corp., 141 BR. 306, 309 (Bankr. WD. Penn. 1992); In
re Sky Valley, 135 B.R. 925, 939 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992); cf Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Pincus, Verlin,
Hahn, Reich & Goldstein Professional Corp., 42 B.R. 960 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1984).
168. Examples of commentary include Mitchell A. Seider, Divulging Confidential Information in
Bankruptcy Cases-Obligations, Protections and the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, published in
Bankruptcy Ethics: The ALI Project - The Law Governing Lawyers, Business Bankruptcy Committee and
Corporate Counsel Litigation Section, Chicago Annual Meeting (Feb. 5, 1995) pp. 29-35; and Jeffrey C.
Krause, When Can Counsel for a Debtor in Possession be Held Liable to Creditors Under the Proposed
Restatement?, published in Bankruptcy Ethics: The ALI Project - The Law Governing Lawyers, Business
Bankruptcy Committee and Corporate Counsel Litigation Section, Chicago Annual Meeting (Feb. 5, 1995) pp.
16-28.
169. In re Sky Valley, Inc., 135 B.R. 925, 939 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992); Mitchell A. Seider, supra note 168, at
29.
170. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Paying the Piper: Rethinking Professional Compensation in Bankruptcy,
supra note 149.
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not charged with a duty to the owners of the debtor, the DIP is very often the
owner or managers employed by the owner. Charting the DIP with a duty that
conflicts with its own interest passes this conflict along to the attorneys that represent the DIP."'
This virus of inherent conflict, described by Professors Westbrook and Coquillette, is the result of the void left by the abandonment of the independent
trustee." 2 It is, of course, the position of Professor Zywicki and Judge Jones.
Because of the structure of the Code and the inadequacy of the employment
provisions, there is uncertainty even as to the client. One knowledgeable commentator states that there are two clients--debtor and debtor in possession.'73
However, Judge Kozynski authored an opinion for the Ninth Circuit which states
174
that the lawyer employed by the debtor in possession represents the estate.
The case is described by a knowledgeable debtor's lawyer as follows:
In In re Perez, 30 E3d 1209, 1219 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit reversed a
confirmation order on the merits and then gratuitously reprimanded counsel for
a debtor in possession for seeking and obtaining a confirmation of a plan of
reorganization which did not comply with the cramdown provisions of Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b). The Court repeatedly referred to counsel for the debtor
in possession as "counsel for the estate", and wrote as follows:
Counsel for the estate... has now proposed three plans that do not comply with the Code's requirements. He has defined Plan III on appeal
before the BAP and before us despite what appears to have been his clear
understanding that Section 1129(b)(2) was not satisfied. This conduct
may well have helped Perez as an individual, but its [sic] not clear why
this benefitted the estate or how it satisfied Perez's fiduciary responsibilities.
Counsel for the estate must keep firmly in mind that his client is the
estate and not the debtor individually. Counsel has an independent
responsibility to determine whether a proposed course of action is likely
to benefit the estate or will merely cause delay or produce some other
procedural advantage to the debtor. While he must always take his directions from his client, where counsel for the estate develops material
doubts about whether a proposed course of action in fact serves the
estate's interest, he must seek to persuade his client to take a different
course or, failing that, resign. Under no circumstances, however, may the
lawyer for a bankruptcy estate pursue a course of action, unless he has
determined in good faith and as an exercise of his professional judgment
that the course complies with the Bankruptcy Code and serves the best
75
interest of the estate.1
171. Daniel Coquillette, Study of Recent Bankruptcy Cases (1990-1996) Involving Rules of Attorney
Conduct (May 11, 1977), WORKING PAPERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-SPECIAL
STUDIES OF FEDERAL RULES GOVERNING ATTORNEY CONDUCT, 293, 302 (A.O., Sept. 1997).
172. Smith, Conflicts, supra note 20, at 823-26. (The virus nearly caused the demise of Justice Brandeis's
appointment to the Supreme Court.).
173. Krause, supra note 168, at 19-20.
174. In re Perez, 30 F3d 1209, 1219 (9th Cir. 1994).
175. Krause, supra note 168, at 20-2 1.
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Life was simple when an independent trustee was in charge. The traditional
ethical rules fit. But the shift from a reorganization controlled by an independent
trustee to one controlled by management has complicated matters. An independent trustee has undivided loyalty; management never does. If the result is to
require counsel to advise management as to its duties, existing rules may fit,
although the potential for dispute, and a resulting claim against counsel, is real.
However, if counsel is a fiduciary for creditors or other parties in interest or represents the estate, the existing rules are inadequate because of the conflict that is
created. How does an attorney determine what is "best" for the estate in assisting management in formulating a plan? Is the attorney subject to being secondguessed? Must the attorney seek comfort orders?
Fortunately, Judge Brett, the District Judge for the District of Oklahoma, has
just written an impressive opinion concerning the duties of counsel for the debtor
in possession. Judge Brett discusses such important issues as (1) who counsel
for the debtor in possession or trustee represents in a Chapter 11 case, concluding that it is not the fictitious "estate"; (2) the duties of the debtor in possession;
(3) the duties of counsel for the debtor in possession; and (4) whether there are
duties to others, including creditors. 7 '
Another problem is that the court may approve the employment of a professional who works on the case for months or years and then is determined not to
be disinterested or is found to have an adverse interest by the same judge or a
higher court. This can be disruptive of the case and is unfair in those situations
where facts were adequately disclosed and the representation approved by the
bankruptcy court. Professionals should be protected for services rendered prior
to disqualification. A recommendation of the American Bar Association to this
effect was not considered on its merits by the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules since it was believed to be a matter of substance outside the authority of the Committee. 1"
Another problem is uncertainty. Professionals cannot live with a standard that
disqualifies because of an appearance or potential. There needs to be a meaningful standard. Section 201 of the Restatement is an improvement. If utilized, as
recommended by the Review Commission Working Group on Ethics, representation of a party in interest in unrelated matters would be disqualifying only if
there is a substantial risk of a material adverse effect on the proposed representation.
176. Concern was expressed by Judge Brett as to the impact of a rule that counsel for the debtor in possession had a fiduciary duty to others.
Of equal concern to counsel for debtor-in-possession under an equivalent or derivative duty theory
is counsel's potential liability to estate beneficiaries. If counsel owes the same fiduciary duty to
creditors and shareholders and other parties in interest as does the debtor-in-possession, any breach
of debtor's duties theoretically exposes counsel to liability to these nonclient beneficiaries, even if
counsel's conduct was not fraudulent or criminal. But see Dieringer, 132 B.R. at 37 (rejecting creditors' claim against debtor-in-possession's counsel for mismanagement, "except to the extent that his
conduct was fraudulent or otherwise intentionally wrongful").
Hansen, Jones & Leta, P.C. v. Segal, 220 B.R. 434, 461 (D. Utah 1998).
177. Memorandum from Prof. Alan Resnick to Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules, 6-7 (Feb. 13,
1992) (on file with author).
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There is also a need to address the inconsistent state conflict rules; they do not
fit bankruptcy cases. There should be federal conflict of interest rules which
preempt inconsistent state rules as to bankruptcy cases. The rules (whether statutory or rules promulgated under the authority of the Rules Enabling Act) could
be modeled on the Restatement conflict rules. 78 One of the more difficult issues
to be resolved will be how to deal with the bilateral litigation rule in the context
of bankruptcy. Judge Carolyn Dineen King believes that the entire bankruptcy
case should be treated as a civil lawsuit, thus precluding representation of a
trustee, debtor in possession, or creditors' committee, absent consent of a party
in interest represented by the attorney in an unrelated matter. Judge Jones and
Professor Zywicki concur, but also are of the view that this is so under the
Bankruptcy Code and cannot be cured by consent. Others have suggested that
until there is a "face-to-face dispute," there should be no disqualification. Both
' speculate that this might allow others to
Professor Zywicki and Judge Jones 79
"leverage" counsel, even though this would constitute a criminal act.8 This
speculative concern can be met by a statute or rule provision requiring that
objections be made early on and providing a good faith safe harbor.
There is still much to be done. It is not an easy subject; if it were, the
American Law Institute would have addressed it. It is a task which requires input
from all interested parties and an unbiased and thoughtful resolution of competing interests.
The good news is that the Standing Committee is seriously considering core
rules governing lawyer conduct. The Committee has recognized the uniqueness
of bankruptcy and has asked the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules to
make recommendations as to the core rules in bankruptcy cases. This fortunate
development was the result of the considerable effort of Professor Daniel
Coquillette, the Reporter for the Standing Committee. Under his guidance, a
series of working papers have been developed on federal rules governing attor178. For a rudimentary draft of key "federal conflict rules for bankruptcy cases" based on the conflict rules
of Chapter 8 of the RESTATEMENT, see note 183, infra.
179. 18 Miss. C. L. REV. 291, 306 (1998). The concern was also stated in the Jones/Zywicki Memorandum
at 7-8 and in Judge Jones's Comments for the Commission. Commission Report 879.
180. 18 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1998) ("A person who ...(6) knowingly and fraudulently gives, offers, receives, or
attempts to obtain any money or property, remuneration, compensation, reward, advantage, or promise thereof
for acting or forbearing to act in any case under title I .").
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ney conduct.181 The most recent of these papers, the Study of Recent Bankruptcy
Cases (1990-1996), authored by Professor Coquillette, discusses rules of attorney conduct--including conflict rules--in bankruptcy cases and touches on some
181. The second study ("Bankruptcy Rule Study") traced the sources of the local standards governing
attorney conduct in each bankruptcy court. The purpose was to determine how closely the bankruptcy courts follow the local rules of attorney conduct used by their corresponding district courts,
which in turn would reveal how widespread the impact of changes in the federal district courts
would be in the bankruptcy court system. This study was built upon the excellent research of
Patricia S. Channon, "Professional Responsibility Rules in the Local Rules of Bankruptcy Courts,"
and a previous report done for this Committee on local rules regulating attorney conduct in the federal district courts and courts of appeal. See Report on Local Rules Regulating Attorney Conduct
(July 5, 1995) (on file with author).
The results of this study reveal that most bankruptcy courts do not have their own independently
Over seventy-three (73) percent of
developed set of local rules governing attorney conduct .....
the ninety-four bankruptcy courts have either explicitly or implicitly adopted the local rules of attorney conduct of their respective federal district courts. Thirty-two (32) of the ninety-four (94) bankruptcy courts have no local rule at all governing attorney conduct. (These courts still require that
the attorney be admitted to the local federal district court, which presumably implies that the attorney is governed by the federal district court's rules of attorney conduct, if any.) Nineteen (19) of the
bankruptcy courts explicitly adopt the standards of attorney conduct employed by the local federal
district court. Eighteen (18) others adopt all the rules of the local federal district court generally.
Thus, sixty-nine (69) of the bankruptcy courts explicitly or implicitly adopt district court standards.
Additionally, three (3) bankruptcy courts use district court rules in combination with other standards, meaning that over seventy-seven (77) percent of the bankruptcy courts could automatically
import changes made to district court attorney conduct rules.
The remaining bankruptcy courts use other standards. Four (4) courts have local rules authorizing
disciplinary enforcement, but fail to state the standard to be applied. Eight (8) bankruptcy courts
refer to the rules of attorney conduct as promulgated by the state's highest court. Three (3) courts
refer to a combination of state and ABA standards. Two (2) courts, the Bankruptcy Courts for the
Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas, adopt the Uniform Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement,
first promulgated by the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management in 1978. One
court (1) [sic], the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Georgia, refers to the "current
canons of professional ethics of the American Bar Association."
As discussed in the prior reports, there is a growing "balkanization" of rules governing attorney conduct in the federal district courts. See Report on Local Rules Regulating Attorney Conduct, July 5,
1995. It appears that the bankruptcy court system has, for the most part, "imported" this problem by
See
adopting the differing rules of attorney conduct of their respective federal district courts .....
also Knopfler v. Schraiber, 103 B.R. 1001, 1003 (Bankr. N.D. IIl. 1989) (holding that a federal court
may consider both the Model Code and the Model Rules as standards governing attorney conduct);
In re Consupak, Inc., 87 B.R. 529, 550 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that a federal court may consider both the Model Code and the Model Rules as standards governing attorney conduct); In re
Glenn Elec. Sales Corp., 99 B.R. 596, 598 (D.N.J. 1988) (disqualified law firm argues Model Code
improperly invoked by District Court in Model Rules jurisdiction).
Daniel R. Coquillette, Study of Recent Bankruptcy Cases (1990-1996) Involving Rules of Attorney Conduct,
Standing Committee Report (June 19-20, 1997), WORKING PAPERS OF THE COMMnTtEE ON RULES OF PRAcriCE

AND PROCEDURE, 299-301 (A.O., Sept. 1997) (footnotes omitted).
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of the areas of disagreement and notes the lack of uniformity. ' An earlier paper
included a proposed redraft of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 83(c).
182. Among the bankruptcy courts, application of § 327 is far from uniform. See the extensive discussion in Marcia L. Goldstein, et al., Ethical Considerationsfor Bankruptcy Professionals:
Disinterestedness, Conflicts of Interest, and Retainers, C995 ALI-ABA 397 (May 4, 1995); William
Kohn, Deciphering Conflicts of Interests in Bankruptcy Representation, 98 COMMERCIAL L.J. 127
(1993). For example, there is a split of authority regarding the application of § 327 for "potential" conflicts of interest. Some courts have held that a "potential conflict" is a contradiction in terms, finding
that all conflicts are actual. See In re Kendavis, 91 B.R. 742, 753-54 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988). ("The
concept of potential conflicts of interest is based on a mistaken interpretation of the Bankruptcy
Code."); In re BH & P, Inc., 103 B.R. 556, 563-64 (D.N.J. 1989) (holding that "[t]he terms 'actual' and
'potential' conflict merely describe different stages in the same relationship" because the prospect of
future conflict could "exert a subtle influence" leading to a more active conflict). On the other hand, the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has rejected a literal reading of § 327(a) and held that there is no
per se rule against employment of counsel where there is only a "potential" conflict. See In re Martin,
817 E2d 175, 180 (1st Cir. 1987). The First Circuit pointed out a practical reason for this conclusion.
"[T]o interpret the law in such an inelastic way would virtually eliminate any possibility of legal assistance for the debtor in possession, except under a cash-and-carry arrangement or on a pro bono basis."
Id.at 180. See the extensive discussion in Peter E. Meltzer, Whom do You Trust? EverythingYou Never
Wanted to Know About Ethics, Conflicts and Privilegesin the BankruptcyProcess, 97 COMMERCiAL L.J.
149 (1992), 154-58 ....To make matters more complex, cases applying § 327 also frequently involve
the conflict of interest rules of the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY ("Model Code") and
the ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. See, e.g., SLC Ltd. v. Bradford Group West, Inc.,
999 E2d 464, 467 (10th Cir. 1993) (Disqualifying attorney who had represented debtor's general partner
under the Utah version of the RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.); In re F & C Intern., Inc., 159 B.R.
220, 222-23 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993) (denying motion of expanded employment for special counsel for
DIP under § 327 of Bankruptcy Code and Canon 5 of the ABA CODE).
Courts have also applied these rules in a variety of ways, contributing to a wide ranging set of interpretations of§ 327. For example, some courts have imported the consent exceptions of the ABA CODE or
In re Dynamark, Ltd.,
ABA MODEL RULES into the Bankruptcy Code, and others have not. See, e.g.,
137 B.R. 380, 381 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1991) (after holding that attorneys did not hold or represent an
adverse interest and were disinterested under § 327, stating that "although consent to representation by
the parties is not necessarily sufficient by itself to overcome a lack of disinterestedness, this court takes
judicial notice that [the client creditor] has submitted a written waiver of any conflict that exits or may
exist"). But see In re Envirodyne Indus., Inc. [sic] 150 B.R. 1008, 1016 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding § 327 does not allow waiver of conflicts of interests); In re Diamond Mortg. Corp. of Illinois, 135
B.R. 78, 90 (Bankr. N.D. II. 1990) ("[C]ertain conflicts that a client could waiver after full disclosure
outside of the bankruptcy context, such as simultaneous representation of the client and the client's
creditors, are prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code itself from being waived.") Other courts have
imported the vague "appearance of impropriety" aspirations of Canon 9 of the ABA CODE in construing the requirements of § 327. See e.g., In re 419 Co., 133 B.R. 867, 869 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991)
(holding that § 327 covers "both actual and potential conflicts of interest in order to avoid even the
appearance of conflict") This despite the intent of the drafters of the ABA CODE that only the mandatory "Disciplinary Rules," not the Canons, should be enforced by sanction. See ABA CODE, "Preamble
and Preliminary Statement," 1 (1969).
At least one law review article has suggested that the conflict of interest standards of the ABA MODEL
RULES are consistent with § 327, while the standards employed by the ABA CODE are not. See William
Kohn, DecipheringConflicts of Interest in Bankruptcy Representation, 98 COMMERCIAL L.J. 127, 13940.... According to Kohn, Congress rejected a per se rule against "potential" conflicts of interest
when it amended § 327 to require an "actual conflict of interest." Id. at 140. He also argues that the
ABA CODE contains Canon 9, which bars even "the appearance of professional impropriety," while the
ABA MODEL RULES do not contain such a per se prohibition and therefore are more consistent with
Congressional intent. See id, at 139-40. Kohn would apparently favor a uniform rule covering conflict
of interest in the bankruptcy courts based on the ABA Model Rules, and would regard that as consistent
with the Bankruptcy Code.
Professor Jay Lawrence Westbrook also sees practical problems in a per se bar against "potential" conflicts of interest in bankruptcy cases. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Paying the Piper: Rethinking
Professional Compensation In Bankruptcy, I AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.287, 288-304 (1993). He
argues that a per se rule against "potential" conflicts will leave debtors unrepresented or represented by
inferior lawyers who are willing to face the risk of disqualification because they cannot find other
work. Id. at 289. Professor Westbrook would most likely support a uniform rule for bankruptcy conflict of interest based on the ABA Model Rules because those model rules lack a per se prohibition
against "potential" conflicts of interest.
There are many other disagreements and policy disputes concerning the proper relationship between the
Bankruptcy Code provisions, particularly § 327, and local rules governing attorney conduct in the bankruptcy courts. This is true whether the bankruptcy rules are based on the ABA Code, the ABA Model
Rules, or on entirely different standards. See the full discussion in Peter E. Meltzer, Whom do You
Trust? Everything You Never Wanted to Know About Ethics, Conflicts and Privileges in the Bankruptcy
Process, 97 Commercial L.J. 149 (1992) ....Whatever position is taken on the individual disputes, one
thing is certain. The conditions in bankruptcy practice are sufficiently different from that in other federal courts as to require separate analysis and, quite possibly, special rules of attorney conduct.
Daniel R. Coquillette, Study of Recent Bankruptcy Cases (1990-1996) Involving Rules of Attorney Conduct
(May 11, 1997), WORKING PAPERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-SPECIAL STUDIES
OF FEDERAL RULES GOVERNING ATTORNEY CONDUCT 293, 303-06 (A.O., Sept. 1997) (footnotes omitted).
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The redraft included an appendix, the Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct
("FRAC").183 Draft Rule 83(c) provides that "the rules governing attorney con183. Daniel R. Coquillette, Study of Recent Federal Cases (1990-1997) Involving Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure 46 (May 10, 1997), WORKING PAPERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
SPECIAL STUDY OF FEDERAL RULES GOVERNING ATTORNEY CONDUCT 235, 275 (A.O. Sept. 1997). The appendix
contains a core of rules, ten in number, which are labeled Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct or "FRAC."
These rules include such matters as applicable standards, confidentiality, conflicts, imputed disqualification,
and conduct of counsel. The Study of Recent Bankruptcy Cases by Professor Coquillette recognizes that there
may be a need for one or more special rules for bankruptcy cases. Daniel R. Coquillette, Study of Recent
Bankruptcy Cases, supra note 180, at 306-08. In recognition of this, I drafted a series of rules for bankruptcy
cases modeled on the RESTATEMENT conflict rules. What follows is this rudimentary draft set of core conflict
rules for bankruptcy cases.
Rule [1]. Adverse Interest
For purposes of §§ 101(14)(E), 327, 328 and 1103, a person holds or represents an adverse interest
if there is a substantial risk that the representation or performance of duties would be materially and
adversely affected by the person's own interests or by the person's duties to another.
Rule [2]. Imputation of Disinterestedness and Adverse Interest to Affiliated Persons
Unless imputation is removed as provided in Rule [31], the restrictions upon a person imposed by
Bankruptcy Code §§ 327, 1103 and 1107 also restrict other affiliated persons who:
(1) are associated with that person in rendering services to others through a partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship, or similar association;
(2) re employed with that person by an organization to render services either to that organization or to others to advance the interests or objectives of the organization; or
(3)
share office facilities without reasonable adequate measures to protect confidential client
information so that it will not be available to other persons in the shared office.
Rule [3]. Removing Imputation
(1) Imputation specified in Rule [2] does not restrict an affiliated person when the affiliation
between the affiliated person and the personally-prohibited person that required the imputation has
been terminated, and no material confidential information of the client, relevant to the matter, has
been communicated by the personally-prohibited person to the affiliated person or that person's
firm;

(2) Imputation specified in Rule [2] does not restrict an affiliated person with respect to a former client under Rule [7], when there is no reasonably apparent risk that confidential information of
the former client will be used with material adverse effect on the former client because;
(a) any confidential client information communicated to the personally-prohibited person
is unlikely to be significant in the subsequent matter;
(b) the personally-prohibited person is subject to screening measures adequate to eliminate involvement by the person in the representation; and
(c) timely and adequate notice of the screening has been provided to all affected clients;
(3) Imputation specified in Rule [3] does not restrict a person affiliated with a former government lawyer if:
(a) the personally-prohibited person is subject to screening measures adequate to eliminate involvement by that person in the representation; and
(b) timely and adequate notice of the screening has been provided to the appropriate government agency and to affected clients.
Rule [4]. Removing Adverse Interest Resulting from Duty of Loyalty
If the adverse interest is the result of a duty of loyalty to a third person, the adverse interest may be
eliminated and the employment approved if the person owed the duty gives informed consent and
the court finds there is not a substantial risk that the existing and former relationship will materially
and adversely affect the representation or performance of duties.
Rule [5]. Representing Person with Adverse Interest
Unless all affected clients consent to the representation under the limitations and conditions provided in Rule L], a person may not:
(1) represent a person if the representation would significantly impair another client's expectation of the person's loyalty;
(2) represent two or more clients in a matter not involving litigation if there is a substantial risk
that the persons' representation of one or more of the clients would be materially and adversely
affected by the person's duties to one or more of the other clients;
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duct in the federal district courts are the Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct."
Draft Rule 1 of FRAC specifies the applicable state rules, and Draft Rules 2-10
are the core professional rules which supersede state rules.18 '
At its January 1998 meeting, the Standing Committee voted to refer the draft
of the Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct to the Advisory Committees for corn(3) represent two or more clients in a disputed matter in a bankruptcy case if there is a substantial risk that the person's representation of one of the clients would be materially and adversely
affected by the person's duties to another client in the matter; or
(4) represent one client in a dispute in a bankruptcy case against another client currently represented by the person, even if the matters are not related.
Rule [6]. Adverse Interest in Representing Organization
A person may not represent both an organization and a director, officer, employee, shareholder,
owner, partner, member, or other individual or organization associated with the organization if there
is a substantial risk that the person's representation of either would be materially and adversely
affected by the person's duties to the other.
Rule [2]. Representation Adverse to Interest of Former Client
A lawyer who has represented a client in a matter may not thereafter represent another client in the
same or a substantially related matter in which the interests of the former client are materially
adverse. The current matter is substantially related to the earlier matter if:
(1) the current matter involves the work the person performed for the former client; or
(2) there is a substantial risk that representation of the present client will involve the use of
information acquired in the course of representing the former client, unless that information has
become generally known.
Rule [8]. Former Government Employee
(1) A person may not act on behalf of a client with respect to a matter in which the person participated personally and substantially while acting as an employee of the government;
(2) A person who acquires confidential information while acting as an employee of the government may not:
(a) if the information concerns a person, represent a client whose interests are materially
adverse to that person in a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that person; or
(b) if the information concerns the government client or employer, represent another public
or private client if there is a substantial risk that the representation of the present client will involve
the use of information acquired in the course of representing the former employer unless that information has become generally known.
Rule [19] Compensation or Direction by Third Person
(1) A person may not represent a client under circumstances in which someone other than the
client will wholly or partly compensate the person for the representation, unless the court authorizes
the compensation arrangement based on reasonably adequate information about the material risks of
the representation;
(2) A person's professional conduct on behalf of a client may be directed by someone other
than the client when:
(a) the direction is reasonable in scope and character, such as by reflecting obligations
borne by the person directing the person to be employed; and
(b) the court authorizes the compensation arrangement based on reasonably adequate
information about the material risks of the representation.
Rule [10]. Positional Conflict
A person may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question that has arisen in
different cases, unless representation of either client would be adversely affected. Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to assert such positions in cases pending in different trial courts, but it may be
improper to do so in cases pending at the same time in an appellate court.
184. Daniel R. Coquillette, Study of Recent Federal Cases, supra note 181, at 277-85. There is a more current draft which is not yet available to the public.
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ment. 8 5 At its June meeting, the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules
voted to report to the Standing Committee as follows:
Advisory Committee supports the concept of draft Rule 1 with an exception to
the applicability of state rules when they are inconsistent with bankruptcy
statutes. In addition, the Advisory Committee would not oppose the "core" federal rules approach (draft Rules 2-10) for the civil rules. If that approach is followed, however, more comprehensive study and drafting would be necessary to
formulate "core" bankruptcy rules. Such an effort would be a long term project,
probably requiring at least three years to complete. 8
After reviewing the input from the Advisory Committees, at its June 1998
meeting, the Standing Committee created an ad hoc subcommittee of members
from each advisory committee to study proposed options as to rules governing
attorney conduct. Each of the Advisory Committees appointed two members to
the Ad Hoc Committee. The author and Mr. Neal Batson have been selected to
represent the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules.
In addition to having the benefit of the Study of Recent Bankruptcy Cases
(1990-1996), the Advisory Committee will have the benefit of a survey similar to
the "Study of Standards of Attorney Conduct and Disciplinary Procedures in
Federal District Courts" to be conducted by the Federal Judicial Center.
I end with a few closing thoughts from a recent address by John P. Frank, my
partner, mentor, and good friend of more than 35 years, on the occasion of his
receiving the Louis E Powell Award. Mr. Frank lauded the role of the Inns of
Court in inculcating "major values of professionalism" and "by bringing together
lawyers seasoned, substantially experienced, and beginners and students, the Inns
can teach civility." Inn members "can become teachers, not teachers in giant
classes watching videotapes on how to do discovery, but teachers as close as
modem times can get to Mark Hopkins on one end of a log and a student on the
other. They can think over problems in a friendly environment, share the skills of
those who have skills to teach, and create an atmosphere of respect for lawyers,
judges, and the law."'87
On a less optimistic note, Mr. Frank observed that,
advertising came with other drastic changes in the profession. I do not need to
claim cause and effect to make my point. We have all of us in the past twentyfive years experienced the conversion of the profession into a money-making
machine and have seen small offices, and sometimes large ones, steamrollered
into oblivion. The demand for hours, the upping from 1,600 to 1,800 to 2,000 to
2,200 or more, and this is the measurement not merely of success but of survival, has totally changed the culture we knew.'88
185. Prof. Daniel R. Coquillette, Reporter, Standing Committee, Memorandum to the Chairs and Reporters,
Advisory Committees, Concerning Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct p. 1 (February 11, 1998).
186. Draft Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules for its Meeting of March 26-27, 1998,
at 12.
187. John P. Frank, Remarks on the Occasion of Receiving the American Inns of Court Lewis F. Powell
Award in the United States Supreme Court, 7 (Oct. 18, 1997) (on file with author).
188. Id. at 6.
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Unfortunately, what Mr. Frank observed is true. The profession has changed
and so has the process of reorganization. We must rethink standards of employment and conflicts in the context of the Twenty-First Century. And, in keeping
with Mr. Frank's suggestion of a return to civility, I encourage those joining in
the debate to heed what Mr. Frank has said. It ill becomes our profession to suggest that those urging reform are motivated by a desire to enhance the practice of
large firms or to sensationalize the issues by discussing irrelevant, but sensational, history and cases.

